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C H A P T E R I 
INTRODUCTION 
''The more technology we introduce into society, the 
more people will want to be with other people," concludes 
John Naisbitt (1982) in emphasizing the need for human 
touch. On a recent talk show Elisabeth Kubler-Ross, author 
of "Living with Death and Dying'' (1981), related that she 
had earned many honorary degrees for her work with the 
terminally ill. She wondered why she had been so rewarded, 
saying, "All I've done is listen to the dying and hear 
what they say." A mother writes to the Boston Globe's 
Confidential Chat column (1983) asking for help in identi-
fying ways to love her baby more. "Can you tell me some 
little ways of loving my baby?" These three quotes over-
whelmingly support the idea that now, as in the past, 
human beings need social understanding, the capacity to 
give an empathetic response, and skills in solving social 
problems that are new to them. These needs taken together 
may be described as the need for a creative social response. 
In everyday social activities, professional circum-
stances, (e.g., counselors, teachers, doctors), and indus-
trial relations, (e.g., managers, laborers, union officials), 
there is a clear need for imaginative and effective social 
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problem solving. Some people seem more naturally able to 
deal adequately with social interactions and problems and 
seem more open to a deep understanding of others. 
What a person perceives, thinks, feels, and does at 
any moment is influenced by a multitude of factors. Sex, 
age, the consequences of the action, intelligence, physi-
cal appearance name only a few of the variables research 
has found correlate to person perception. This begins to 
suggest the complexity and uniqueness of social under-
standing. Having offered an argument for a need for crea-
tive social response and an indication to its complexity, 
this paper will continue with arguments for what appears 
to be a need for a new perspective on social understanding 
of others and social interaction. 
Problems with Current Perspectives 
In daily life, people exhibit behaviors and these 
behaviors are perceived, integrated and categorized by 
those who observe them and by the acting persons them-
selves. Cognitive and social psychologists identify small 
parts of the whole process of interaction to study. These 
individual elements of social behavior have been researched 
from various points of view as well as in varying combi-
nations. The combinations of variables and differences in 
the choice of elements produces differing directions in 
study. Thus the study of social interaction is often im-
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peded by varying definitions used within the research and 
disagreement about which features are crucial in researching 
social behavior. Predictably the results often provide 
contradictory information. Few research studies attempt 
to examine larger clusters of behaviors or to study social 
interaction in a natural setting. The problems with cur-
rent perspectives seem to be terminology, orientation of 
the researchers, and measurement methods. 
A noted cognitive psychologist, Walter Mischel, argues 
against a single, narrow approach to the study of social 
understanding. Mischel (1973) suggest three complimen-
tary perspectives from which to study interpersonal percep-
tion, that of the clinician, theorist, and experiencing 
person. The clinical psychologist seeks procedures or oper-
ations necessary to produce changes in performance and so 
focuses on environmental conditions, (e.g., conditioning, 
reinforcement, modeling). The theorist is concerned with 
the person variables and how these operations produce their 
effects in subjects, (e.g., specificity in constructs, ex-
pectancies, subjective values and heuristics). On the 
other hand, the experiencing person speaks of these same 
events as thoughts, feelings, and wishes, and other inter-
nal states of experience. Mischel (1973) argues, "Ulti-
mately, conceptualizations of the field of personality will 
have to be large enough to encompass the phenomena seen 
from all three perspectives." 
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CoITLmunication is difficult to achieve among researchers 
even within fields of psychology because of inconsistent 
terminology and differing theoretical orientations. This 
lack of communication is succinctly described by Walker 
and Foley (1973) in a review of the history of the study 
of social intelligence. 
The present failure to recognize that one person's 
social intelligence may be another's interpersonal 
competence or role-taking and communication is 
apparently based not only on the diversity ofter-
minology but the difference of theoretical origins 
of the various approaches. 
Methods of measurement also vary widely as do the 
personality variables under study. For example, the 
complexity of the research on person perception or on 
social intelligence rests on controversies about con-
struct validation and appropriate measurement devices. 
The laboratory based scientific paradigm and the Piagetian 
view that perception of the physical world is exactly 
parallel to that of the social world have been influencing 
factors on direction of research. Movements away from the 
above positions are toward research undertaken in natural-
istic settings and are viewing inter-social perceptions 
as more than merely the same as perceptions of the physi-
cal world. These changes in research direction suggest 
the need for new methods by which to study a broadened 
view of person perception. 
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Need for a New Perspective 
Social interaction observed in naturalistic settings 
suggest a needed new pe rspective. The following examples 
show a range o f subtly differentiated aspects of sensiti-
vity to social problems and empathic intelligent responses. 
The examples below describe a powerful cluster of traits 
that I argue should be called soc ial creativity. 
1) A teacher sits at her desk with her head held up 
by her hands. A smal l voice next to her says, "Your head 
must really hurt. Is there something I can do for you?" 
Are you alright? -- seems to be a question overlooked and 
not valued by some. Yet others like the student in this 
example display a sensitivity to feelings and tone. 
2) A child runs from the room in tears, unable to con-
tinue with his report. Another child addresses the class, 
"I think he cried because he was nervous. Maybe when he 
comes back we can all smile and say how well he did on 
part of his report." This student shows a real motivation 
to address the hurt of others and the willingness to risk 
peer ridicule in order to respond supportively to an 
out-group member in adversity. 
3) A teacher gives only brown-eyed children candy on 
Martin Luther King Day to teach about discrimination. A 
brown-eyed child throws her candy away, unable to enjoy 
it when others in her class don't have any. All other 
brown-eyed children happily eat their candy. This example 
shows a strong sensitivity to something missing in a 
scenario, a moral issue that needs to be addressed in 
some way. 
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4) A mother is asked how she deals with her children 
by several friends and neighbors because she seems instinc-
tively to know just the right solution for every large or 
small situation. Adults (and children) like this mother 
seem to produce comprehensive solutions to social problems. 
5) A boy talks his friends into playing a different 
game other than the one generally played so a new child 
can be included. He does this because he is aware that 
a new child would not fit in the old game. Prior to his 
suggestion, no one else in the group seemed aware of any 
potential problem. "How did you think of that?" is often 
a question asked of people who predict social problems 
before they happen, as the boy in this example shows. 
6) A child leading a group discussion seems inter-
ested in the remarks of another child. He even appro-
priately and positively comments at the conclusion of the 
shy, stammering and lengthy commentary. All others in 
the group have lost interest. The group leader exhibits 
imaginative performance in perception, cognition and re-
sponse. The child noticed a problem, understood the meaning 
of the situation, especially to the speaker, and took a 
position of action under risk in front of an uninterested 
group of peers. 
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7) At recess, a teacher sends a child whose feelings 
have been hurt to the classroom to write notes to two 
other children who have been teasing her. Other teachers 
have never been able to find a way to persuade other child-
ren to include this child. They laugh at the note strategy, 
but it works and the excluded child is included in a game 
during the next recess. Socially creative people are 
optimistic and touch and persuade others through example, 
as this teacher did. 
8) A child finds out at school that a parent has been 
taken to the hospital. Another classmate finds just the 
right words to ease the tension, "I'll bet the ride in the 
ambulance was fun. Just think, the doctors are fixing 
your Mom right now." Being effective in a social crisis, 
knowing the comforting thing to do or say without extended 
thought is another trait that seems to belong to the clus-
ter of socially creative traits. 
The above examples are taken from my classroom ex-
periences in the fourth grade over a fourteen year period. 
These and similar examples have occurred and have been 
observed time and again. Previous studies seem to attempt 
to correlate these behaviors and traits with social in-
telligence or with emotional factors, such as empathy. 
It seems to me that these traits are distinctive and power-
ful examples of creativity manifested in social problem 
solving, or social creativity. 
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A pattern of features generally recognized as be-
longing to the realm of creativity seems to evolve in the 
eight examples of social interaction. The features that 
identify this pattern of traits as those belonging to the 
world of creativity are uncommon sensitivity to tone and 
feelings, openness to ideas and people, motivation to ad-
dress sensitive issues with an action under risk attitude, 
rare sensitivity to missing pieces in a scenario, compre-
hensive solution production, foresight to predict social 
problems before they happen. In creative processes and 
creative products (e.g., a musical composition, a paint-
ing, a scientific discovery) one can find these same ele-
ments. 
This pattern of creative traits seems to divide nat-
urally into three categories, that of perception, cogni-
tion and response. For clarity sake, I will use the term 
perception to mean noticing and data gathering; cognition 
to mean processing data, meaning making, and understanding; 
and response to mean action or inaction. (Inaction and 
silence are included because they are sometimes assessed 
to be the most beneficial response.) Rational and affec-
tive elements also characterize performance in each of 
these three categories. 
In example six, the child leading the group discussion 
noticed (even at his young age of nine years) that the 
class was losing interest in the stammering commentary 
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being given by a child with language processing problems. 
Most children did not notice, nor seem concerned. Se-
condly, the leader understood the meaning of the disin-
terest of the other children to be embarrassing to the 
speaker. Again that cognition, inclusive of rational 
thinking skills and empathic understanding shows a rare 
sensitivity and openness to people who are different 
which led to an observable response. Risking peer ridi-
cule, the leader chose an interested attitude, asked ques-
tions of the speaker to spark class interest and made 
favorable comments as summary remarks. In this example, 
the discussion leader illustrates uncommon social percep-
tion, cognition, and response, as recognized in domains 
of creative performance. Effective functioning in any 
one of these categories is worthy of attention and value 
(e.g., noticing a formerly unidentified problem, under-
standing a new relationship, and taking original action 
to solve a problem that someone else may have identified 
and conceptualized). 
When social behavior is creative it is marked by the 
integration of what others call social cognition, empathy, 
and social intelligence. It will be the purpose of this 
paper to argue that the term, social creativity, incor-
porating cognitive and affective factors, is needed be-
cause it is more than social cognition, more than empathy, 
more than social intelligence alone. 
The term, social creativity, was first coined and 
studied by Hendricks, Ghilford, and Hoepfner (1969), 
10 
but used differently from my use. These researchers, 
working within Guilford's structure of the intellect 
model, used the term to mean creative social intelligence. 
In fact, Guilford, et al. (1969) state, "The major ids-
advantage of this approach (~quating social creativity 
with social intelligence) is that non-intellectual quali-
ties that contribute to creative performance are not in-
culded in this view." The term, social intelligence, does 
not suggest the contributions of the whole person, of both 
intellectual and affective factors. This seems especially 
unsatisfactory since the materials being processed here 
are interpersonal events. Thus all further use of the 
term, social creativity, will refer to my more holistic 
interpretation of the concept (see page nine). 
A Proposal for a Creative Combination 
The following paragraphs will argue for the viabil-
ity of the concept of social creativity identifying 
support for the concept in the work of experts in the 
field of creativity. 
Bruner (1973) writes that, 
An act that produces effective surprise -- this I 
shall take as the hallmark of a creative enterprise. The content of the surprise can be as various as the 
enterprises in which men are engaged. It may express itself in one's dealing with children, in making love, 
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in carrying on a business, in formulating physical 
theory, in painting a picture. . What is curious 
about effective surprise is that it need not be rare 
or infrequent or bizarre and is often none of these 
things . . Effective surprises seem rather to have 
the quality of obviousness about them when they occur, producing a shock of recognition following which there is no longer astonishment. 
The e xamples of behavior listed previously have the de-
fining features Bruner demands, especially the production 
of an effective surprise. 
Creativity, as commonly used, refers to behavior that 
yields a tangible product, such as a poem, a scientific 
theory, or a musical composition. Guilford (1974) writes, 
however, that a product is not always necessary. He says, 
to the psychologist, there can be creative thinking 
even when there is no tangible product. There are 
always some products of thought and it does not matter 
whether or not they are expressed. They can still be detected in a number of ways. The approach must be largely indirect and inferential, which is not to 
suggest that we cannot make observations, for we can. 
Thus, Guilford's statement eliminates the "non-tangible 
product" problem, offering further support for describing 
the cited true-life social behaviors as creative. 
Torrance's description of the processes accounting 
for creative behavior in recognized domains offers further 
support for the description of creative behavior in the 
social domain. Torrance (1963) states, 
Creative learning brings into play such abilities as 
evaluation (especially the ability to sense problems 
and missing elements), divergent production (fluency, flexibility, originality and elaboration) and rede-finition (seeing something in a way different from 
the usual, established or intended way, use, etc.). 
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This description captures the processes outlined in the 
eight observations listed previously. They reveal the 
ability to sense problems and missing elements, a rare 
sensitivity to missing pieces in a scenario, uncommon 
comprehensiv e solution production, and seeing something 
in a way different from the usual. 
Thus it may be enlightening to view social inter-
actions in relationship to creativity studies. Eventhough 
these two lines of research, social understanding and 
creativity, seem to have different goals, it has been 
argued that the similarities of features are too clear to 
ignore. Perhaps, the term, social creativity, is the 
creative combination that will result in a more holistic 
theory that encompasses the concepts of person perception, 
empathic response and social intelligence. 
Assessing Social Creativity 
Even among cognitive psychologists one can find sup-
port ~or looking holistically at social problem solving. 
A recent approach gaining recognition among cognitive 
researchers "focuses on cognition during actual social 
interaction," using observation in naturalistic settings 
as its method, Damon (1981). Moment-to-moment interaction 
and social understanding cannot be reduced to cognition 
about the physical world. This movement away from viewing 
the perception of the social world as being the same as 
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perception of the physical world has been a significant 
change of direction, yielding perhaps, a more enriching 
view of social understanding. Properties and relation-
ships that exist in the social world do not exist in the 
physical world. Placing the emphasis on social realities 
and focusing on observations of actual social inter-
actions in natural settings demands a multidimensional 
measurement model. Perhaps, this trend that Damon (1981) 
identifies among social cognitive developmental psycholo-
gists forecasts the identification and recognition of the 
new concept I argue for. 
I believe the concept of social creativity, which 
juxtaposes elements of social problem solving and creati-
vity, is necessary and useful because it will help iden-
tify similarities across constructs and suggest new 
methodologies for psychology and education. 
Direction of the Paper 
Having argued for the existence of social creativity 
as observed in daily life, I will proceed in chapters two 
through four with a selective review of the psychological 
literature on social cognition, empathy, and social intelli-
gence to determine whether any of these concepts can ade-
quately account for the behavior cited. I will proceed 
to identify the connections between these concepts and 
creativity. Examining the concepts, their relationships 
14 
to each other, and the degree to which any of these 
concepts alone can account for imaginative social problem 
solving will demonstrate the need for a new unified con-
cept and for an integrated or multidimensional theory of 
social creativity. 
Addressing the problem of measuring social creativity, 
I will conclude the paper with some suggestions for class-
room appropriate activities that might facilitate the 
study of this concept, in a natural setting. These 
classroom activities may be useful as an explanatory 
device for the concept of social creativity. 
CH APTER II 
SOCIAL COGNITION AND PERSON PERCEPTION 
The review of the psychological l i terature provided 
in this chapter addresses two questions: are the concepts 
of social cognition and/or person perception adequate to 
account for the complex act of social creativity, and 
second, are the methods of study used in exmining these 
concepts appropriate methods for the study of social crea-
tivity . This chapter will begin with a review of the 
trends in the study of social cognition. 
Researchers in the field of social cognition have 
shifted emphasis in recent years from studies of group 
responses to studies of individual responses. In addition, 
the research revea ls a change from a sole concentration 
on the rational principles affecting cognition to the in-
clusion of information about the non-rational biases 
and intuitions of the experimental subjects. Early work 
was founded in the assumption that social cognition is 
exactly parallel to cognition of the physical environment. 
Recent work questions that assumption and suggests that 
motives, moods and biases have a strong effect on social 
cognition and therefore experimentally investigate these 
15 
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factors. This chapter points out continuing strands of 
study, demonstrates changing patterns and hopefully iden-
tifies a common unity, that of the relationship of social 
cognition to creativity (social creativity). 
Early Studies 
The study of social cognition has its roots in the 
1920's literature on social intelligence (to be reviewed 
in Chapter IV). Thorndike (1920) distinguished social 
intelligence from two other human intelligences, abstract 
and mechanical thinking. He defined social intelligence 
as "the ability to understand and manage men and women, 
boys and girls to act wisely in human relations." 
Thorndike (1920). In the 1920's and 1930's studies and 
tests of social intelligence as related to interpersonal 
judgments were bountiful. 
Interest in the study of social intelligence slowed, 
however, as experimental developments showed the increasing 
complexity of the problem. Researchers encountered diffi-
culties in taking into account the personal orientation 
of subjects and individual differences. The focus of 
this research was concerned with the ability to judge 
people. The methods used were mainly rating or ranking 
of personality traits. Group tendencies were observed 
with similarities as their focus, rather than a focus on 
differences among persons, individual differences. The 
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r e sults were contradictory a nd confus i ng and a widely 
accepte d defini tion of social inte lli?e nce was not 
attained. Thus, measureme n t comp l e xity problems contri-
buted to the decline in attention to social intelligence. 
Several de cades later cognitive psychologists began 
t o giv e attention to the interaction with social environ-
ment. They, however, acce pted, for the most part, the 
traditional position of Piaget (1963) that "the reaction 
of intelligence . . to the social environment is exactly 
parallel to its reaction to the phy sical environment." 
Much of this developmental work focused on intellectual 
skills in the non-social or impersonal environment. Sub-
jects were asked to answer questionaires and perform cog-
nitive tasks in the solitary confinement of the laboratory. 
The intent of the research was to demonstrate the existence 
of a social ability that was different from general intelli-
gence and verbal ability. An important shift occurred as 
the emphasis turned from Thorndike's cognition and action 
to cognition or perception, integration and categoriza-
tion alone without emphasis on the second part of 
Thorndike's definition, that of action. The terms, person 
perception, interper sonal processes and social perception 
and social cognition were used, often interchangeably, 
instead of the term social intelligence. Action and inter-
action, behavioral products, were all but ignored. 
Critical of this development, Bronfenbrenner (1958) 
states, 
For an American psychologist nothing is so attrac-
tive as an operational definition and when such a definition can be combined with an objective pro-
cedure yielding a numerical score, temptation to gather data is virtually irresistible. Nowhere is 
this tendency more clearly evidenced than in the field of interpersonal perception. 
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Cognitive responses of the individual were analyzed 
to provide group data. The response of the individual 
in a laboratory setting without the influence of factors 
occurring naturally in the environment and in the rela-
tionships of interaction with other people can only be 
seen as one-dimensional. If the individual brings pre-
conceptions and individual influences to the social cogni-
tive response then group data developed from these indi-
vidual responses gathered in isolation hardly seem a 
sound basis for generalizations about the natural responses 
of individuals functioning in groups. 
The Contribution of Recent Social Psychology 
Social psychology, in the late 1960's and 1970's, 
produced many important changes both in the focus of 
studies and in the methods used. Researchers became con-
cerned with individuals, shifting the emphasis from group 
data to individual cognitive responses. The Attribution 
Theorists carried this research forward. Kelley (1973) 
greatly influenced this trend in social psychology. A 
renewal of the inference perspective was a focus of the 
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Attributionists. Ross (1981) points out that the focus 
is on 
.two closely related cognitive tasks confronting 
the social perceiver. The first task is that of 
causal judgment whereby the perceiver seeks to assess 
the personal or situational causes to which some particular effect (e.g., action or outcome) may most 
reasonably be 'attributed.' The second task is that 
of social inference whereby the perceiver deduces 
the abilities, traits, or other dispositions of particular actors, and the demands and constraints 
of the situations to which those actors have re-
sponded. 
Making causal inferences and judgments is an important 
part of social effectiveness. 
Attribution Theorists were concerned with the 
successes of individuals not necessarily their failures. 
Theorists attempted to develop general principles of 
making correct causal judgments. However, a shift of em-
phasis ca~e when it became increasingly intriguing to iden-
tify biases that might cause distortion of causal judgments 
and social inferences. This gradual shift from the study 
of logical construction of principles to a study of attri-
bution error and bias" has led us to look beyond 
the specific tasks of social attribution to other equally 
important tasks involved in human inference and under-
standing." Ross (1981) 
Prediction, estimating the future from the past or 
working from the known to the unknown, became a focus of 
debate. Studies (e.g., Lord, Ross, Lepper, 1979; Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1971) seemed to show that social prediction 
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wa~ ba3ed on prior conceptions and categorizations with 
little weight given to immediate information. Increasingly, 
investigators concerned themselves with the questions of a 
rational/irrational debate. The general rational princi-
ples of judgments, estimates and inferences purported by 
the attributionists have often been shown to be subject 
to the irrational effects of bias, attitude, mood, and 
reliance upon intuition, (see Ballenbach and Madigan, 1981; 
Berndt, 1981; Kurdek and Rodgen, 1971; Lord et al., 1979). 
Clearly, the outcome of these debates was beneficial 
as a focal point of not only differences in theories but 
similarities that can be seen even in the different view-
points. The preoccupation with general cognitive princi-
ples to the neglect of affective and motivational pro-
cesses, excluding what intuitively and as a result of the 
rational/irrational debates is known as real-life social 
behavior, has been alarming to many social cognitive theo-
rists. One consequence of the debates seems to be a move-
ment toward the study of multidimensions in social cogni-
tion, rather that the development of principles of cogni-
tion, to the exclusion of other social, personal and envi-
ronmental influences. Investigating social cognition in 
terms of cognition, inclusive of affective and environ-
mental influences, can only suggest further investigative 
routes and enlarge our understanding, 
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A New Trend 
The debate over whether cognition of the social en-
vironment is the same as cognition of the physical envi-
ronemnt continues with social cognitive developmentalists 
being divided on the issue. Is social cognition exactly 
parallel to cognition of the physical environment as 
Piaget (1963) suggests or are there influencing factors 
on social cognition and interrelationships that make 
social cognitions different from those of the physical 
world? This question still remains the basis of debate 
today. 
Entering this debate, Berndt (1981) states, "Research 
on social cognition stands at the intersection of two 
older research areas, studies of nonsocial cognition and 
studies of social behavior." He proposes that exploring 
similarities and differences between the two areas would 
lead to integration of research and perhaps valuable 
insights. 
Flavell (1981), although not advocating that social 
cognition is exactly parallel to nonsocial cognition, 
says that social cognition could be thought of as guided, 
monitored and maintained similarly to nonsocial cognitions. 
Flavell (1981) suggests that". . application to social 
cognition of previous .ideas concerning the nature and 
development of nonsocial cognition is useful.'' He pro-
poses, 
22 
social cognition enterprises are monitored (i.e., over-
seen, a ppraised , regulated, guided) through the ac-
tions of the interactions among metacognitive know-ledge , metacognitive expe riences, goals (or tasks) 
and actions (or strategies). Flavell (1981) 
Hoffman (1 981) sees the two domains of physical and 
social environments as quite separate and operating under 
different rules. " . It is based less on logic and more 
on probability, shared cultural belief systems, cultural 
stereotypes, and scripts." Hoffman (1981) 
Yet even in the disagreement of debate, useful 
similarities can be discovered between social and non-
social cognition. The cognitive study of prototypes, 
principles, scripts and categorizations can give further 
insight to what Hoffman (1981) calls more intuitive sys-
tems, cultural stereotypes, scripts. 
The following summaries of recent research show that 
whether studies today follow the traditional laboratory 
paradigm or take place in more naturalistic settings, 
the newly emerging model seems to be that cognition of 
the social world is distinct from cognition of the physi-
cal world. 
Fellman (1983) following the more traditional labora-
tory model of individualized cognitive testing, studies 
decoding (recogni tion) of emotional expressions and en-
coding (posing) of emotional expressions. He found that 
four and five year old children demonstrated the ability 
to correctly identify expressions (in pictures) of anger, 
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sadness and happiness. Yet the results of this experi-
ment are discussed in terms of social cognitive develop-
mental factors, not physical cognition parallels. 
Gottman et al. (1975), following a more naturalistic 
model of observation and interview, though cognitive in 
nature, emphasize the social environment rather than a 
comparison to the physical cognitive world. They re-
searched friendship and social competence in third and 
fourth graders. They conclude that popular children are 
more socially skillful than unpopular children and in-
teract differently with their peers. Popular children 
are more knowledgeable about how to make friends and 
have a high verbal fluency. 
Viborg (1982) studied cognitive understanding of 
social situations in children ages five through eight. 
Using the causal judgment and social inference paradigm, 
Viborg determined that prior to age eight social percep-
tion is restricted to single causal reasoning and aspects 
of a situation as overt actions and feelings of sadness, 
gladness, and anger. Interpersonal motives and multiple 
causal reasoning had not begun to emerge. In this study 
the children were shown scenes on videotape and asked to 
describe the actions and emotions of the actors. The in-
clusion of actions and emotions follows the social envi-
ronmental emphasis rather than social cognition in sole 
relationship to the physical world a nd brings back into 
focus Thorndike's 1920 def inition which include d both 
cogn ition and action. 
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Additional Variables Emerge in Recent Developmental Studies 
The literature of t he late 1970's and 1980's is filled 
with studies of social cognition, which are based on recog-
nizing a more multifaceted definition, linking affective 
characteristics to cognition. Kurdek (1975) found support 
for his hypothesis that perspective taking is a multi-
dimensional social cognitive construct". . whose dimen-
sions themselves are multifaceted . " He names three dimen-
sions of taking another person's perspective (perspective 
taking) as perceptual, cogni tive and affective. He finds 
facets of even those dimensions. For e xample , h i s study 
sees an increase in the perceptual and cognitive dimensions' 
development through the third grade. After that age Kurdek 
theorizes that the older children could be using projection. 
Marsh et al. (1981) found a positive relationship 
between affective perspective taking and effective inter-
personal functioning. They state, 
In light of the absence of such a relationship for 
social perspective taking, it would appear that 
feelings may play a more important role than cog-
nitions in interpersonal relations. 
Ballenbach and Madigan (1982) add mood to the list 
of influences on social cognition. They state in their 
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study, ". 
nitions." 
. emot i onal states can influe nce s ocial cog-
I n a summary chapter in a volume on social cognitive 
development, Flavell and Ross, Ed s. (1981) state 
We will close by renewing our plea for closer and 
more sympathetic contact between developmentalists 
and nondevelopmentalists who, sometimes inadvertantly 
and some times deliberately, blaze exciting trails for 
one anot her to follow. 
Each shift of emphasis and model of study have value. Yet , 
as Damon (1981) laments, social cognition " . is a many-
sided phenomenon, and it is not surprising that neither of 
the major approaches to its study has succeeded in inves-
tigating all of the sides together." 
I see here a perfect example of one of the main 
points of this paper; that is, to exclude factors in re-
search, to consistently remain one-dimensional, limits 
an investigator and restricts experimental results. Rather, 
to combine results, to view ideas in the light o f opposing 
principles (a tactic of creative individuals) can add fur-
ther insight and l ead to more effective experimentation. 
A combined look at developments within the area of social 
cognition with those studies in the areas of empathy, 
social intelligence and creativity (to be discussed in 
subsequent chapters) may be a key to evolving a more valid 
view of the understanding of others, one closer to what we 
know intuitively from common-sense, real-life observations. 
26 
A Proposal for a Creative Commonality 
The rational/nonrational debate, the physical environ-
me nt/social e nvironment dilemma, the shift of emphasis from 
the physical to the social, the developmental stand of 
comparison of individual differences and the nondevelop-
mental s tand of generality, gathering group data to deter-
mine general principles, might be unified with a commonal-
ity of creativity in the social realm. Some creative 
thinking techniques found to be useful in gaining a new 
perspective are rearranging, combining, substituting, 
adapting and finding forced relationships. Throughout 
this chapter I have pointed out combinations, adaptations 
and relationships that have led to a more thorough under-
standing of social cognition. Perhaps , an even more 
powerful combination might be achieved by joining the 
studies of social cognition and those of creative thinking. 
The recent trend which emphasizes social environment and 
personal interaction, along with the trend to include affec-
tive dimensions rather than solely rational cognition in 
the study of social cognition seem to be leading in the 
very direction of the combination that I have labeled 
social creativity. 
Bruner (1973) thoughtfully theorizes, 
. I propose that we define the creative act as 
effective surprise -- the production of novelty. It is reasonable to suppose that we will someday devise 
a proper scientific theory capable of understanding 
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and predicting such acts . . It may be, however, 
that there is another mode of approach to knowing how the process generates itself and this will be 
the way in which we understand how symbols and ideas 
. capture men's thoughts. Often it is the poet 
who grasps these matters most firmly and communicates them most concisely. Perhaps, it is our conceit that 
there is only one way of understanding a phenomenon. 
The concept of social creativity, discussed in Chapter one 
of this paper, could be the conceptual commonality between 
social cognition and the poet's ideas. Social creativity 
could be a link between scientific understanding and meta-
phorical understanding. The concept of social creativity 
which juxtaposes the concept of sociaL cognition and 
creativity could lead to insights and similarities across 
the available constructs of social cognition, in all of 
their variety. The approach of combining the study of 
social cognition with the study of creativity, of seeing 
the creative thinking involved in social cognition, and 
in measuring it in a natural setting, could be the most 
fruitful approach to the many unanswered questions in 
social cognition. This approach will be discussed 
thoroughly in Chapter five of this paper. 
CH APTER III 
EMPATHY 
Empathy has been defined and redefined in theoretical 
and operational terms. On the way toward unifying my 
position that a concept of social understanding must be 
inclusive of affective as well as cognitive factors, this 
chapter reviews some of the most recent definitions of 
empathy and focuses on salient studies linking empathic 
understanding to the variables of age, moral development, 
sex, motivation, similarities of the perceiver and the 
observed, flexibility, and predominant affective state 
of the perceiver. Following a discussion of Rogerian 
empathic listening therapeutic paradigm and his views on 
empathy and therapeutic change, the relationship of em-
pathy to social cognition, the usefulness of distinguish-
ing similarities and differences therein, and the ade-
quacy of the concept of empathy to account for the complex 
act of social creativity as described in Chapter one is 
presented. The need for a new approach which shows the 
relationship between a multidimensional conception of 
empathy and creativity, is considered. 
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Confusion in Definition and Methods of Measurement 
The literature seems to be filled with a variety of 
definitions that, although similar in nature , view empathy 
in slightly different ways. Walker and Foley (1973) quote 
Dymond, who in 1950 developed an instrument to measure 
"empathy which means . . the imaginative transposing of 
oneself into the thinking, feeling, and actions of another . " 
Walker and Foley (1973) also state that Kerr and Peroff, 
in 1951, devised another instrument of measuring empathy, 
defining it essentially as "the ability to put oneself in 
the place of another and anticipate their behavior." 
Although these definitions are similar, it can be argued 
that they lead researchers in slightly different directions. 
Cognitively, it could be said that understanding how an-
other feels is empat hy . Af f ectively, it could be said 
that feeling the same as another is empathy. Alternately, 
empathy has been defined af fe ctively as almost an emotion-
al communion and cognitively as a mechanism of identifica-
tion and understanding. A definition that combines new 
features might be worthy of consideration. It would de-
fine empathy as an emotional communion that could also 
cognitively articulate and understand the other'·s view. 
Such a definition seems to achieve a creative and needed 
synthesis, that is, of emotionally and cognitively under-
standing and articulating another's view. 
Confusion seems to reign in definition, instruments 
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of measure, and the dichotomy of affective and cognitive 
approaches. One might ask at this juncture, however, if 
the dichotomies need to exist. An examination of the re-
lationships between existing research studies may lead to 
a more multidimensional view. 
Role-taking, Projection, and Sympathy as Related to Empathy 
The term, role-taking was first coined by G.H. Mead in 
1934. Grief and Hogan (1973) quote Mead as describing em-
pathy as, "the capacity to take the role of the other" thus 
adopting different roles and perspectives. Mead suggested 
that role-taking practice leads to social sensitivity. 
Hogan (1975) expresses this role-taking model theoretically 
in terms of the development of moral conduct and under-
standing of moral development. "The concept of empathy, 
which refers to a sensitivity to the needs and values of 
others," is an essential underlying element of role-taking 
and moral development. Role-taking and empathy become 
synonomous in the explanation of moral development and 
social sensitivity. 
A further review of the literature shows empathy 
being used interchangeably with projection, social sensi-
tivity, intuition, altruism and even at times sympathy. 
Feshback (1975) restricts empathy 
. to a match in affective response between sub-ject and object. Thus a sympathetic emotional reac-
tion, although like empathy, implying an understanding 
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of the emotional state of another person, is not equi-
valent t o and should be distinguished from an em-
pathic reac tion. 
Feshbach (197 5 ) cont inues the debate po inting out that 
projection and empathy, though similar, must be differen-
tiated . 
For projec tion, characteristics of the subject or 
perceiver are attributed to the stimulus object, 
while in the case of empathy the subject assumes the 
emotiona l attributes of the stimulus person. 
Shantz (1975) states that 
. the difficulty in conceptualizing empathy as 
something different than s ympathy and projection 
and the issue of empathy as a process or product 
suggest that a more systematic "nomological net-
work" is needed for the con struct. 
Here action and reaction, pro jection and attribution, pro-
cess and produc t seem to bring to mind the rational/irra-
tional debates o f the cognitive developmentalists. If one 
assumes the emotional attributes of the stimulus person, 
it would seem that they must cognitively perceive and 
attribute those emotions first. An interaction of ideas, 
a jux taposition of definitions and approaches point to a 
relationship worth consideration of the affective/cognitive 
domains of social cognition and empathy. 
The problems of measurement of empathy have led to 
a refinement of definition and a reduction of the concept 
of empathy to elements of the process of social sensitivity. 
The influence of projection on ''raw empathy" scores (the 
disparity between the subject's predictions of response of 
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an associate and the actual associate's response) compelled 
Bender and Hastorf (1953) to propose a method of measuring 
"refined empathy'' (score received without influence of pro-
jection due to similarity of subjects and associates). 
The purpose was to eliminate the influence of projection 
in a subject's predictions of the response of an associate. 
Hogan (1975) tried to resolve the dilemma of measurement 
distinguishing between state and trait empathy. Hogan 
argues that the empathy scale he developed measures trait 
empathy (inherent in some individuals) and the Truax (1971) 
scale assesses state empathy (seemingly empathic behavior, 
not necessarily genuine). 
It would seem that the issues of construct definition, 
measurement differences and terminology confusion need re-
finement in all areas that touch upon interaction and in-
terpersonal associations. Can the self of the subject 
ever by totally eliminated in a social situation? I contend 
a negative answer needs to be given to that question. To 
carry this thought further, perhaps the gestalt whole needs 
to be viewed and not its parts or their unequal sums. 
Empathy Variables and a New Trend in Measurement 
Age, intelligence, cognitive and behavioral differ-
ences, affective domains, and sex differences are variables 
that have been studied in relationship to empathy. As in 
the study of social cognition (e.g. Damon, 1981) the trend 
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of empathy r e s e arch seems to be movi ng toward more natura l -
istic setting s wi thout t he limita tions of the laboratory 
paradigm. 
Developmentally, age emerges in the literature as 
important in r e lation to empathy . Borke (1971) r easons 
that social sensitiv i ty increases with age. He suggests 
that very young children are not totally egocent ric but 
have some capacity for responding e mpathically . Along 
the se same l ines of thought, showing that age increases 
internalized values, Eisenberg-Berg (1979) states that 
''elementary school children's reasoning tends to be hedon-
istic, stereotyped, approval and interpersonally oriented 
and involved with concern with other's needs." With ad-
vanced age, high school students reflected "strongly em-
phatic and more abstract internalized moral concerns." 
Rothenberg (1970) testing social sensitivity defined 
as "the ability to accurately perceive and comprehend the 
behavior, feelings a nd motives of other individuals" found 
a relationship between social sensitivity and age in testing 
third and fifth graders and that intelligence is important 
in the ability to understand another's behavior. Rothenberg 
(1970) called for testing on empathy to be done in more 
"realistic situations" than the laboratory. Perhaps this 
method would yield results more directed toward the whole 
person rather than parts leading to the whole. 
Strayer (1980) following Rothenberg•s call for realis-
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tic situational s tudies, devised a naturalistic study of 
preschool children and found that prevailing affect (happy/ 
sad) matching responses indica t e empathy. Mood, Johnson, 
and Shantz (1978) exami ned forty-six month to fifty-nine 
month old children and found a relationship between ego-
centric affect matching and s ocial comprehension, but 
concluded that s ocial comprehension can occur without 
affect matching. 
Hughes et al. (1981) interviewed kindergarteners and 
second graders about feelings and thoughts during slide 
presentations. They found older subjects used personal 
cues and psychologi cal reasons rather than situational 
factors. However, younger ''subjects increased under-
standing about others following reflection on their own 
reactions to other's feelings." The more a person if 
perceived t o be simi lar to the observer the stronger the 
empathic reaction. Again, however, a natural rather than 
laboratory setting was used. 
A study done by Cutrona and Feshbach (1979) focuses 
on cognitive and behavioral differences that were found 
among children who used "dispositional information" 
(feelings, motives and personality traits) as opposed to 
children who primarily used "situational information: (ex-
ternal circumstances) to predict behavior. The "disposi-
tional information" users were found to be less aggressive 
35 
and exhibited more prosocial behavior as rated by their 
teachers than the ''situational information" users. The 
suggested classroom activities, described in Chapter five 
of this paper, are based in part on this finding. The 
combination of cognition, behavior, and affect together 
with the notion of creativity could bring areas of philo-
sophy, psychology, and education closer to the true mean-
ing of social cognition, social understanding, empathy, 
and, in the case of this thesis, the synthesis term of 
social creativity. 
Sex differences are interesting variables in terMs 
of empathy and again seem to raise great controversy. 
Hoffman (1977) defining empathy as a "vicarious affective 
response to another person's feelings" found it to be more 
prevalent in females than in males. Females were not 
found to be more adept at assessing affective, cognitive 
or spatial perspectives, however. Hoffman (1977) suggests 
that females may be "part of a prosocial affective orien-
tation" whereas males due to socialization may "have a 
set to act rather than to feel." 
Gilligan's (1982) treatment of the subject of sex 
differences in the areas of empathy and moral development 
is one that attempts to question the experimental results 
of a male dominated philosophical and psychological world. 
She points out that studies have been based on constructs 
devised by males, while studying young boys, which some-
what eliminate female differe nces when they are placed 
within those constructs. 
Gilligan (1982) writes, 
When one begins with the study of women and derives developmental constructs from their lives, the out-line of a moral conception different from that described by Freud, Piaget, or Kohlberg begins to 
emerge and informs a different description of development. 
The female mode of relating to the world seems to 
stem from attention to the issues of care and responsi-
bility rather than from attention to the issues of fair-
ness and rights, a condition more common to males. 
Gilligan (1982) laments , 
This different construction of the moral problem by 
women may be seen as the critical reason for their failure to develop within the constraints of Kohlberg•s system .• 
of six stages of moral development. 
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It seems that the concept of social creativity, des~ 
cribed in Chapter one of this paper, encompasses both a 
male and female construction, A male emphasis on fair-
ness and logical rules, whether brought about genetically 
or through socialization, need not be in competition with 
a female emphasis on care and responsibility, whether 
brought about through nature or nuture, in socially crea-
tive processes or actions. In fact, perhaps, either con-
ception or a combination of both can be open and sensitive, 
with a motivation to address hurt, and an ability to predict 
social problems and produce solutions under risk. This 
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may be so because the concept of social creativity com-
bines the affective, cognitive and behavioral variables. 
Rogerian Views on Empathy, Therapeutic Change and Measurement 
In an examination of relevant literature on empathy, 
one cannot overlook the profound impact of Carl Rogers on 
theoretical formulations and clinical practices. Roger's 
client-centered therapy is based on empathic understanding 
of the therapist for the client. In the 1950's he outlined 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the therapeutic 
change: 1) accurate empathy (empathic understanding), 
2) nonpossessive warmth (unconditional positive regard), 
and 3) genuineness (congruence, non-phony). His early 
(1959) definition of empathy as related in a later work, 
Rogers (1975) is in part, 
The state of empathy or being empathic, is to per-
ceive the internal frame of reference of another 
with accuracy and with the emotional components 
and meanings which pertain thereto as if one were 
the person, but without ever losing the "as if" 
condition. 
The last two decades have witnessed a proliferation 
of studies based on the works of Rogers. Some research 
concerning relationships of variables to empathy have 
been mentioned previously in this chapter. The trend is 
toward naturalistic studies, but Rogers and his students 
have been criticized for lack of controls in their studies. 
Bergin (1971) suggested that the results of client-
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centered researchers could not be generalized to other 
types of therapy. Lambert (1978) reviews the client-
centered view of empathy research debate, concluding that 
the results are ambiguous and "Rogerian conditions have 
not been proven." Other researchers have questioned 
client-centered research methodology. Rachman (1973) 
stated, "Unfortunately, however, most of these lack ade-
quate control groups." Luborsky et al. (1971), on the 
other hand, tried to identify therapeutic skills showing 
up across all studies. They conclude that empathy shows 
a reliable relationship with desired results in therapy. 
Gladstein (1977), however, concluded a review of the 
literature without being able to find a reliable rela-
tionship between empathy and positive change in thera-
peutic situations. 
Rogers (1975) himself reviews his earlier studies 
and definitions and concludes, 
I would no longer be terming it a ''state of empathy" because I believe it to be a process, rather than a 
state. . The way of being with another person 
which is empathic has several facets. 
Rogers (1975) continues to mention entering the private 
perceptual world of another, being sensitive moment to 
moment, sensing meanings without making judgments and 
ends by stating, 
In some sense it means that you lay aside yourself 
and this can only be done by a person who is secure 
enough in himself that he knows he will not get lost in what may turn out to be the strange or 
bizarre world o f the other, and can comfortably 
r e turn to his own world when he wishes . 
Growth and change, building upon previous works 
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must continue i n the study of e mpathy. Ou t of contro-
versy, dilemma and debate, one may hope to find areas of 
s i milarities and new means of combinations. For example, 
Gladstein (1 977) deduced that empathy is unnecessary in 
counseling. In an article of refutation, Bellingham 
(1978) says, "I would recommend that counselor preparation 
programs view empathy as necessary but not sufficient." 
Commenting on the interactive relationship between mea-
surement tools and the concepts under rev iew, Lambert 
(1978) states, 
Improvements in methodology may yet lead to a signi-ficant revision of the client-centered hypothesis and 
an increase in its ability to specify conditions leading to therapeutic change. 
~rnprovernents in methodology, manipulations and combinations 
of variables may lead to a more holistic definition of em-
pathy, a more true-to-life construct. 
Feelings and thoughts, perhaps a combination o f affec-
tive and cognitive , yield a complicated yet plain picture. 
Rea l life states and products, complicated as they may be, 
could be thought of as simply combinations. Davis (1981) 
discusses a recent movement towards integration. 
In fact, it is a growing belief among empathy theor-ists and researchers that our understanding of empathy 
can improve only with the explicit recognition that 
there are both affective and cognitive components to 
the empathic response. 
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I could not agree more enthusiastically, but would also 
add creativity to comp l e te the understanding. The combi-
nation of social cognition, empathy and creativity may 
allow one to conceive of an individual in an interesting 
and more complete way . 
Training and Creativity Factors Involved in Empathy 
If understanding others and being in tune with them 
can help better the lives of self and others, then perhaps 
it is important to know whether empathy can be learned 
and will remain with the individual. It is generally 
accepted that some form of empathic understanding can be 
learned. Using a Rogerian definition of empathy, Goud 
(1975) studied undergraduates receiving empathy training, 
He found the students to be capable of learning empathic 
understanding and that learning can occur in large groups 
over a short time span and also that learning can be main-
tained over time. Gantt et al , (1980) studied empathic 
sensitivity in paraprofessionals and demonstrated that 
training could increase empathy and maintain it six to 
fourteen months when subjects were re-examined. It is 
important to keep in mind the learning of empathy strate-
gies, since it is a component of the idea of social crea-
tivity. 
Self-disclosure and flexibility are creativity factors 
that can also be associated with empathy. Neimeyer and 
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Banikiotes (1981) found "self-disclosure flexibility, de-
fined as the variability in self-revelation across targets 
and situations," has been associated repeatedly with social 
perceptiveness. They found that groups (dyads) of students 
all highly flexible "evidenced greater predictive accuracy 
(e.g., empathy) and interpersonal attraction" than groups 
(dyads) of students all with low self-disclosure flexibi-
lity. Being flexible and giving of the self in interper-
sonal revelation seems to be related once again to an as-
pect of creativity. In the realm of interpersonal rela-
tions it would seem that openness, flexibility and self-
disclosure would be vital. In the realm of creativity, 
whether it be social or personal, i t would seem that these 
same characteristics are necessary . For example, the 
painter or the actor opens self to others through their 
works as does the teacher, counselor or friend, even if 
their original purposes may differ. 
Actors take another's role. They creatively develop 
a sensitivity toward the person whose role they are taking. 
Creatively role-taking and creatively acting, then, might 
be closely related. Perhaps social creativity is more than 
empathy alone, more than social cognition alone and more 
than social intelligence alone, but rather a combination 
of all these factors with creativity. 
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A New Dire ction f or Study 
If, as Rogers (1975) says, 11 being empathic is a com-
plex, demanding, strong yet subtle and gentle way of 
being," then one could reason that these dichotomies could 
be resolved in a crea tive act, a new approach called 
social creativity. 
Barron (1968) concludes a discussion of the diffi-
culties of researching the creative process with, 
One can only shoulder the burden, accept the limi-
tations and try to reconstruct with the aid of ima-gination the living process of which our correlation 
coefficients give us a murky picture. 
Dissertation studies have begun to lead in this direction . 
Morisette (1978) found support for the hypothesis that 
children with a high imaginative predisposition who 
engage in fantasy and role-taking types of play early in 
childhood develop skills which are necessary for the de-
velopment of empathy, while studying fourth graders. Frank 
(1978) in a study of college students found the results of 
his study supported the hypothesis that training in flexi-
bility shifting between reality-oriented and imaginative 
behavior can increase the ability to navigate the social 
environment, empathize with another, and reason about social 
interactions. 
Rogers (1975) stresses the vital role empathy plays 
in human interaction. "Empathy gives that needed confirma-
tion that one does exist as a separate, valued person with 
an identity." Social creativity may be that encompassing 
concept including social cognition, empathy, social 
intelligence and creativity, with the clarity to reach 
beyond for the identity and value of each person, as 
measured by observation and interview in natural sur-
roundings. 
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CH APTER IV 
SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE AND CREATIVITY 
''Plato c ompared the intellect to a charioteer guiding 
the powerful horses of the passions; he gave it both the 
power of perception and the power of control." Cattell 
(1971). Within that power of perception, one wonders if 
the perception of others, the understanding of others is 
complete and included the passions. 
In creative litera tur e, novels, short stories, plays, 
songs, lyrics, and poetry , the power of perception of others 
is considered. Though our tests of intelligence do not mea-
sure social intelligence per se, the study of it is alive 
and well. In t he literature, social intelligence exists, 
many times synonymously, with role-taking, empathy, inter-
personal competence, social cognition and person perception. 
This paper has examined two of these so-called synonyms, 
(social cognition and empathy) and, through a review of cur-
rent salient literature, will discuss social intelligence, 
shifts of emphasis in its study, current dilemmas, debates, 
problems of measurement, and its relationship to creativity. 
The goal is to determine if the construct of social intelli-
gence alone is adequate to account for the complex act of 
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social creativity. A more indepth discussion of Guilford 
et al. (1965 and 1969) will show that, although the term, 
social creativity, was coined by Guilford, it was used in 
a more restrictive way than the meaning proposed in this 
paper and thus, it did not include the affective factors 
shown in the empathy research to be such an important ele-
ment in the understanding of others. Again, openness, 
sensitivity to problems and flexibility, all defining fea-
tures of creativity, appear to be the co:mrnon attributes 
seen in examples of effective social intelligence, social 
cognition, and empathy. The concept of social creativity 
captures those elements and seems to have explanatory power 
in accounting for deep imaginative understanding in a clear 
and useful way. 
A Renewed Interest in Social Intelligence 
Social intelligence and social cognition had their 
beginnings in Thorndike's 1920 definition which distin-
guished social intelligence from abstract and mechanical 
intelligences (discussed in Chapter two). The diversity of 
approach and findings in the study of social cognition and 
social intelligence had several sources. Experimenters had 
limited success devising a valid and reliable test of social 
intelligence; and they had difficulty with the many indivi-
dual differences of their subjects while desiring their 
studies to yield more general group data. Method and orien-
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tation cause d r e s earche r s to choose dive r gent paths. The 
complex ity of these conc eptual and methodological problems 
cause d the study of s ocial intell i gence to decline . 
Although interest waned for two decades, there was 
renewed interest in the s t udy of social intelligence in 
the last twenty years . This began when Guilford (1959) 
proposed a general theory of intelligence that found a 
place for social intelligence. In his structure-of-the-
intellect model, the r e are four kinds of intelligences. 
One dealing concrete l y with things through the senses, he 
calls figural i n telligence. The second dealing with mathe-
matics and languages, he named symbolic intelligence. The 
third , abstract intelligence, deals with thoughts and the 
fourth, social intelligence, is how Guilford says we deal 
with the human behavior of the people with whom we come in 
direct contact . 
Referring back to Thorndike ' s original conception of 
social intelligence as having two parts, most social intelli-
gence r esearchers now incorporate attention to both those 
parts, understanding or perceiving and coping or acting, in 
their studies. The first part, understanding or perceiving 
others, has been defined as having six behavioral social 
cognition abilities by O'Sullivan, Guilford and deMille 
(1965); "l) cognition of behavioral units, 2) classes, 
3) relations, 4) systems, 5) transformations, and 
6) implications." 
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A later study by Hendricks, Guilford and Hoepfner 
(1969) concerns itself with the second part of social in-
telligence, coping or acting upon the behavior of others, 
dealing primarily with the basic solution-finding skills 
in interpersonal relations. Using the method of factor 
analysis, six abilities, and many other subabilities, were 
defined and related to the structure-of-intellect paradigm 
in both of these studies. 
A brief description of the six factors of behavioral 
cognition might be useful here. Hendricks, Guilford and 
Hoepfner (1969) define each. 
1) "A unit of behavioral information is a single condi-
tion or state of an individual•s disposition of the moment." 
The person is amused or angry or alarmed. We can discern 
these units by cues such as a smile, a frown, or raised 
eyebrows. 
2) "A class of behavioral information, like a class of 
any other kind, is a generalized affair." The units become 
categorized into classes of units having common entities, 
i.e., states of pleasure or disgust. 
3) "A relation is some kind of recognized connection 
between two states or actions." These relations can come 
between opposite states, such as pleasant/unpleasant or be-
tween two persons. 
4) ''A behavioral system can be found in the interactions 
of three or more persons." An example is that of a policeman 
arresting a traffic violator while enduring bystanders' 
threats. 
5) "A transformation is a change or shift . . a 
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modification of one's conception of the behavior in ques-
tion." An example used is one of first thinking a victim 
is drunk until we find he has suffered a heart attack. 
6) "An implication is an item of information suggested 
by other information." An example used here is when handed 
a bag of groceries the clerk expects money in return. It 
is explained that individuals use these abilities with 
varying degrees of success and some are exceptionally high 
or some low in their use of all six, but most individuals 
are uneven in their ability to use these six factors. 
The O'Sullivan, Guilford and deMille (1965) study and 
the Hendricks, Guilford and Hoepfner (1969) study are im-
portant because they offer more complete pictures of under-
standing others, that of perceiving and responding. The 
importance of this work also lies in the more structured 
attempt at construct measurement through an individual dif-
ferences approach . In addition, Hendricks, Guilford and 
Hoepfner (1969) point to creativity as a factor in the realm 
of social action and problem-solving. This is a first 
attempt at identifying a social behavioral creativity in 
relation to the intellect. 
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Social Psychology of Creativity 
No researcher recognized the concept of social 
creativity until the Hendricks, Guilford and Hoepfner 
(1969) study, "Measuring Creative Social Intelligence." 
These authors accounted for social creativity as a parti-
cular form or example of social intelligence. It l.S 
claimed by these authors that other investigators attemp-
ting to correlate intelligence and creativity have been 
measuring cognitive abilities, as do most IQ tests, not 
behavioral divergent abilities as their tests do. As 
noted in Chapter one of this paper Guilford et al. (1969) 
recognize the shortcoming of their position when they 
state, "The major disadvantage of this approach (equating 
social crea ti vi ty with social intelligenc;) is that non-
intellectual qualities that contribute to creative perfor-
mance are not included in this view." 
We might question at this juncture whether it is 
appropriate to relate the behavioral or action ability or 
even the perception or understanding ability solely to 
the intellect when affective components are stressed in 
both studies of creativity and empathy. Yet the affective 
factors are left out of Guilford's explanation of social 
understanding or social intelligence. Creativity, most 
assuredly, is inclusive of affective behaviors. Empathy, 
an ability most notably linked with the affective domain, 
has been tied to person perception, social cognition, social 
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intellige nce, role-taking, projection, so much so that the 
terms are used interchangeably throughout investigative 
literature. 
Now that cognitive and behavioral factors have been 
combined with social intelligence in this important study, 
Guilford et al. (1969), affective factors cannot be ignored. 
An attempt must be made to develop the concept of social 
understanding multidimensionally and holistically. Amabile 
(1983) suggests that there is 
. virtually no research on the social psychology 
of creativity, the interaction of social/environ-
mental factors with personality characteristics and 
cognitive abilities and the effects of such factors 
on observa ble creativity. 
Perhaps, the time is now. 
We might , then, b e able to conclude reasonably that 
a concept of social ability, inclusive of cognitive and 
affective factors, under the commonality of creativity, 
could yield a relationship worthy of study. To restrict 
the idea of social creativity to a relationship void of 
the wholeness of human beings is to restrict its fullest 
conception. If social understanding and social interac-
tions are a part of the concept of creativity inclusive 
of cognitive and affective domains, then perhaps indivi-
dual differences can be conceptualized in an interesting 
way, social creativity. 
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Defin i tio n and Me as urement Pr oblems 
There is as much disagreement o n definition of crea-
tivity and measureme nt of creativity (e. g., Klein, 1982; 
Treffinger et al., 1983; Torra nce and Hall, 1980; Guilford, 
1982) as there is with social intelligence (e.g., Neisser 
et al., 1979 ; Keating, 1978; Fisk, 1971; Ford, 1982; 
Shanley et al. , 1971; For d et al., 1983) 
Guilford and his co- workers have their critics of 
course. Criticizing all of Guilford'' s creativity tests, 
including that of cre ative social intelligence, Cattell 
(1971) states that they have 
.gone to abilities beyond intellige nce, neverthe-l e ss have defined creativity in the test performance itself, instead of by some life criterion through 
which the designation of a test as a creativity mea-
sure could be validated. The result is that the 
v eridct that a test measures creativity is only a projection of the test constructor's view about what 
creativity is. 
Urging the most fundamental skepticism, Keating (1978) 
warns empirical investigators against using the "construct 
of social competence or social intelligence as if it were 
a clearly defined domain. 
evidence." 
. in the absence of confirming 
Neisser (1979) accepts the concept of social intelli-
gence but refers to it as "everyday intelligence." He says 
of its measurement, 
Tests of everyday intelligence, like those of crea-
tivity, are so inadequate to the construct they seek 
to measure that one cannot decide the theoretical 
issue on the basis of the operational measures 
currently used to address the issue. 
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Sternberg et al. (1981) studied the layperson's 
versus the expert's view of intelligence. They state that 
the factor of social competence is implicit in layperson's 
conception of intellige nce and show". .the experts, 
like the layperson, perceived intelligence as comprising 
quite a bit more than is presumably measured by IQ tests." 
They conclude by saying, "None of the currently available 
explicit theories seem to do justice to the full scope of 
intelligence, broadly defined. Perhaps no one theory ever 
could." 
Despite their complexity, however, the issues of 
social intelligence and those of creativity will not dis-
appear. Neisser (1979) points out that, 
It may be that there is no one unified construct of 
everyday intelligence but several constructs. Such 
multiplicity of constructs would explain why no one 
trait has emerged in the research that has been done to date. 
Neisser (1979) urges researchers to explore a "multi-
plicity of constructs." Kurdek (1975; see Chapter two of 
this paper) goes a step further and suggests that social 
intelligence may be a multidimensional, social-cognitive 
construct "whose dimensions themselves are multifaceted." 
Davis (1981; see Chapter three of this paper) argues that 
both the "affective and cognitive components to the em-
pathic response" must be attended to. 
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The limitations of the concepts currently used in the 
empirical literature as pointed out by these researchers 
support the argument for a new and more comprehensive 
concept with greater explanatory power. Social cognition 
(or person perception), empathic response, social intelli-
gence (or everyday intelligence), and creative social 
intelligence could be integrated into a multidimensional 
theory of social creativity, studied in a naturalistic 
observational approach, that could allow for a broader 
structure for analysis and understanding. 
Current Research and its Implications 
Howard Gardner (1984) in a recent controversial volume, 
proposes a theory of seven intelligences. He challenges 
current definitions and measurements of human potential. 
His theory stems from his work with brain diseased veterans. 
He claims these seven personal intelligences can be de-
veloped and trained. Gardner identifies the seven intelli-
gences as linguistic, logical-mathematical, spatial, musi-
cal, bodily-kinesthetic, interpersonal and intrapersonal 
intelligences. 
Based in Eastern philosophies and the literature on 
self-actualization, knowledge of self, Gardner (1984) argues, 
"The more you understand about other people, the more poten-
tial you have for understanding yourself, and vice versa." 
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Regarding me thodology , Gardner (198 4 ) a lso advocate s 
"getting r i d of numbers e nt ire ly " and doing awa y with "the 
unitary dime nsion calle d i n t e lligence." 
Like Gar dner, the recent work of Torrance and Hall 
(1980) has raised s i milarly f undamental questions. Torrance 
and Ha ll ( 19·80) recommend that a study of creativity should 
examine and addre ss "further reaches of creative potential." 
Some of the "reaches" or domains they name and suggest in-
vestiga t ion of are charisma, precognition, super rapport, 
telepathy, intui tion, and group creativity. In their ana-
lysis of empathy or s uper rapport, Torrance and Hall (1980) 
say, "Another human ability that seems to lie outside of 
the realm of rational thinking is that of emapthy and super 
awareness of the need s of another." They suggest that 
empathy should be understood as a supra-rational behavior 
instead of a rational response. They propose that flexi-
bility (resistance to premature closure) and originality 
(se eing things in unusual perspectives) are basic to the 
nature of super awareness. 
Therefore it appears that creativity, empathy, social 
intelligence, and social cognition are most recently being 
seen as necessarily interrelated. Torrance and Hall (1980) 
argue, 
. .perhaps the key to understanding this ability supra-awareness of the needs of another is the findings from creativity research that highly effec-tive creative people integrate into their personali-
ties a number of polar opposites. Highly creative people are at the same time more masculine and more femine, more conforming and more nonconforming, 
more independent and more dependent, more serious 
and more playful, more timid and more bold, more 
certain and more uncertain, and more receptive and 
more self-acting than their less creative peers. 
The integration of these polarizations suggests that the 
socially creative person has the ability to defy logical 
rational explanations. 
Perhaps these polarizations have impeded the evolu-
tion of a unified concept to date which could totally 
explain the real-life phenomena I have labeled social 
creativity. But we see in this recent work, however, 
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both on creativity and on social intelligence, the begin-
nings of a new approach, broadened beyond the scope of 
Guilford's model of the intellect. Based on this, my 
proposal that we account for social creativity with a 
multi-dimensional concept which includes both cognitive 
and affective components, both perceptive and responsive, 
follows logically. 
Recent Assessment and Research Approaches 
Arguing the need for their "creative reaches" concept, 
Torrance and Hall (1980) say the ways of seeing creativity 
could open a whole new understanding, and go even a step 
further and recommend combined procedures. They propose 
new research approaches they suggest would not go against 
reason, but simply be outside the realm of reason. 
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Measurements of creativity are difficult especially when 
creativity is viewed as having such a large number of 
complex ways in which it might be demonstrated. The 
measurement methods Torrance and Hall (1980) suggest are 
varied. They propose 
. autobiographical instruments, collections of 
critical incidents, observational studies, peer and teacher nominations and similar devices might also be used to assess motivational and other variables 
associated1with the further reaches of creative potential. 
Clearly, these new and expanded conceptions of social in-
telligence and creativity require new tools for measure~ 
ment, as does the combined concept of social creativity. 
Identifying some problems in developing tools of 
measurement, Klein (1982) points out, 
Researchers can identify only what they can measure, 
and they measure only what they can quantify. Hence 
what becomes known as creativity is that which can be quantified. The result is an academic metonymy or an identification of one small part with the whole con-
cept. 
Rejecting this, he proposes a paradigm of creativity and 
its measurement that is inclusive of product, process, 
personal and environmental factors. Klein recognizes the 
interactive relationships between cognitive and affective 
1
rn an article responding to Torrance and Hall, Guilford (1982) disagrees, 
I would maintain that from a rigorous point of view 
all human behavior, including creative thinking, is 
rational or logical, and it is up to psychologists to discover the nature of that rationality. 
factors in the operation of the creativity process. He 
compares the current processes of the measurement of 
creativity to catching butterflies with a bear trap, and 
concludes with the suggestion that observational data be 
used and quantified. 
Creative writers often make the suggestion of the 
powerful and illuminating idea of lightning. In Emily 
Dickinson's poem, Tell all the Truth, I find support for 
the "further reaches of creative potential" proposed by 
Torrance and Hall (1980). 
Tell all the Truth but tell it slant--
Success in Circuit lies 
Too bright for our infirm Delight 
The Truth's superb surprise 
As lightning to the Children eased 
With explanation kind 
The Truth must dazzle gradually 
Or every man be blind--
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It seems as if researchers in the three areas examined 
in this paper thus far, social cognition, empathy, and 
social intelligence, are moving toward a multifaceted 
approach, difficult to measure, but observable in natural-
istic settings. Perhaps a "circuit" method of collecting 
data, such as observation, a method of many directions, 
would be more illuminating than a straight forward logical 
and quantifying method which would be like looking at 
lightning straight on and being blinded by it. The more 
"circuit" method of many directions may be one way of 
getting many perspectives on social creativity, on "Truth's 
superb surprise." 
C H A P T E R V 
A POWERFUL COMBINATION 
In this chapter I will put forth a proposal of 
explanatory devices and me asurement for the concept of 
social creativity that I advance, which includes product, 
process, personal, and environmental factors. I have re-
cogni zed the cognitive/affective dichotomy in social 
creativity throughout the preceding chapters. This chap-
ter proposes that the conce pt o f social creativity is the 
unity for which psy c h o l o g ica l, philosophical , and educa-
tional theorists in the forementioned fields have been 
searching. I propose t ha t creat i vity is the s y nthesizing 
factor which unifies the cognitive and affective e l ements 
of social understanding and action a llowing them to be 
better understood and explained. 
Although creativity has been discu ssed throughout 
this paper and extensively in Chapter four, it was always 
reviewed in terms of social understanding or social in-
telligence or empathy. Following a discussion of the need 
for a new concept, this chapter will take a theoretical 
look at creativity itself, and then view creativity in 
relation to the proposed concept of social creativity. 
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A Need for Synthesis 
The importance of creativity in all human endeavors, 
especially in today's social interactions, should never 
be minimized. Solving problems in all areas of society 
requires social understanding and imagination. Defining 
appropriate innovations in the field of science, for ex-
ample, pollution, energy and disease, requires recognizing 
the validity and different perspectives and skill in re-
solving conflicts arising from these. The fields of psy-
chology and sociology need to creatively answer questions 
of mutual trust, aid and understanding in order to achieve 
problem solutions. The areas of art and literature are 
needed as a vehicle to achieve levels of social harmony 
which are admittedly necessary by most concerned persons. 
The joining of social understanding with creativity builds 
a relationship worthy of consideration if only for the 
innovations that could result in all fields of human in-
quiry and endeavor. 
We wonder about the future. A noted futurist, Isaac 
Asimov (1984) maintains that schools will become increasingly 
essential as centers of social interaction and understanding. 
Asimov (1984) in his address to educators as reported by the 
Boston Globe, said that computers will suffice for the in-
formational elements of education. "This, in turn, will 
free students to develop in the areas of insight, intuition, 
fantasy and creativity -- human attributes that are not 
transferable to even the most advanced computers.tt If 
Asimov's predictions hold true, then social creativity, 
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that collection of traits discussed throughout this paper, 
perhaps, is a concept that should be fostered and developed. 
Creativity, a Synthes is 
A review of the study of creativity points to a 
variety of concepts stemming from differing perspectives. 
There are theoretical approaches emphasizing the cognitive 
and rational aspects of creativity (e.g., Guilford, 1965, 
1969; Torrance, 1979). There are theoretical approaches 
emphasizing the affective nature of creativity and the 
contribution of personality traits to the creative person 
and creative act (e.g., MacKinnon, 1978; Barron, 1972; Roe, 
1952) . 
Guilford maintains that creativity is essentially a 
cognitive function, the most important being divergent 
thinking, characterized by productive thinking. Koestler, 
in his bisociation theory, portrays the creative process 
as mental occurrences associated with incompatible con-
texts. Freud saw a similarity between neurosis and crea-
tivity and located its origin almost totally in the uncon-
scious and brought to the realm of human consc i ousness by 
creative individuals. Arieti maintains that psychiatry 
can make major contributions in the field of creati vity 
by indepth study of i ndiv idual c a ses. Many approaches 
stress the s e lf- r e alization or self-actualization of the 
individual as related t o the openness and flexibility 
neede d in order to p r oc e ss i n f orma tion creatively (e.g., 
Rogers, 1961; Maslow, 1959). 
It seems as if these theories and appr oaches are in 
need of a connector. In the collection of cognitive/ 
affective traits calle d creativity, one might find the 
connector to be metaphor . Arieti (1976) states, "A 
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poet sees similari t ies in the dissimilar in the process 
of creating a metaphor." Arieti (1976) also quotes Aris-
totle's Poetics, "The greatest thing by far is to be a 
master of metaphor; . it is also a sign of genius 
since a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of 
the similarity in the d issimilar." 
Creativity, e xpanded to include the relationship of 
creativity and social understanding could only aid in ex-
tending the direction and scope of psychologists, philo-
sophers and educators toward unraveling the human mystery 
of social understanding. The poet, the artist, the 
scientist put together many different elements to bring 
about unified ideas, creatively. Viewing creativity 
multidimensionally, bringing together dissimilar asso-
ciations, inclusive of cognitive, affective and social 
domains could yield a broader structure, a holistic human 
metaphor. The social creativity of social human beings, 
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perhaps, could be an important part of this human metaphor. 
"The Magic Synthesis" is what Arieti (1976) sees as 
the essence of creativity, as his title suggests. Crea~ 
tivity has been divided and dissected; at times it is 
illusionary and ill-defined. Arieti (1976) differentiates 
between "ordinary creativity," that of every man, and "great 
creativity," such as that of Shakespeare. In most measure-
able constructs there seem to be degrees of ability (e.g., 
intelligence, cognition, empathy). Of course, creativity 
would be found in varying degrees in individuals as well. 
Does that necessitate minute differentiation, another 
series of dissections? Arieti (1976) recognizes two major 
approaches in the study of creativity; a holistic study, 
a study of the total creative person, and a study of "spe-
cific ingredients" of a creative personality. Arieti 
claims a true magic synthesis, an understanding of crea-
tivity, will only come about through a study of the syn-
thesis of personality variables and the unconscious and 
conscious processes. 
I contend that to evolve a deep understanding of ele-
gant and fit solutions to complex problems of social inter-
action, one needs to incorporate the concept of creativity 
and social understanding. The concept of social creativity 
allows one to look at divergent responses applied to the 
subtle and complex stimuli of social behavior and see the 
ways in which our knowledge of increasing creative problem 
solving can be applied to crucially important human 
problems. 
Problems of Measurement 
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Having viewed creativity and social creativity as a 
synthesis and determined its need, the problem of measure-
ment must be addressed here. All investigators must choose 
a valid and reliable measurement tool. Fiske (1971) states, 
"The comprehensive and fully adequate measurement of a 
whole concept in current personality theory is an awesome 
task." The tendency, then, seems to be, Fiske (1971) says, 
to divide constructs and "analyze them into subconstructs 
for pertinent modes of observation, each such subconstruct 
subsuming others that designate separate manifestations 
and situational aspects.'' One might inquire here, if the 
portion studied may in fact lose some important aspect of 
the whole. Perhaps, the call by some social cognitive 
developmentalists and investigators of the concept of 
empathy and social cognition to investigate all sides of 
a construct together, inclusive of all its subwholes and 
their interactions, in more naturalistic settings is more 
in tune with measuring a multidimensional whole, even if 
an awesome task (e.g., Damon, 1981; Strayer, 1980; Rothen-
burg, 1970). Barron (1972) summarizes this argument by 
stating, "The whole self creates." 
Cheek and Buss (1981) argue that, 
Experimental laboratory research is so complicated that researchers have tended to limit themselves to one personality variable at a time. Perhaps the time has come to confront the complexity of 
using several different personality dispositions 
as the independent variables of the experiment. Such usage might not only make a difference in the 
results . . but also offer a better view of the 
complexity of personality as it influences social behavior. 
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I agree and would like to carry the view one step further 
by recommending a cha.nge in the site of the studies from 
the laboratory and into real-life situations, such as 
classrooms. 
Bekdal (1977) advocates the use of personality in-
ventories to test for creative potential. An inventory, 
observation in natural settings (classrooms), personal 
descriptions, checklists are all legitimate and available 
means of measuring a concept holistically (Torrance and 
Hall, 1980). 
Education and Training 
It seems important to interject a discussion of the 
work on training and education for creativity, social in-
telligence and empathy at this juncture, since education 
strategies are a crucial part of my proposal for the 
measurement of social creativity. In addition the paten~ 
tial real-world gains that educating for social creativity 
can make is one of the important underlying concerns of 
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this paper . Writers and t he o r i s t s in the f ie ld of educa ~ 
tion have suggested that creativity can b e deve l oped and 
i ncre ase d in individuals by pa r ticular train ing strategies 
(e. g., Torra nce, 1963 ; Guil ford , 1974; Blee dorn, 198 1 ; 
Renzulli, 1977; Ga lla gher, 19 75). These strategies of 
creative problem solvi ng and imaginative thinking have 
been field tested i n c l ass r ooms. 
Studies showing a relationship between jobs assumed 
to require high levels of social intell i gence or empathy 
(e.g., social worker, counselor , child care worker) and 
the creative factors o f fluenc y , flexibility, originality, 
and elaboration have been somewhat illuminating (e . g. , 
Reardon e t al., 1979 ; France and Kay, 1 9 76; Wheeler, 1976; 
Hesselroth, 1979). What has emerged from the s e studi es is 
evidence that empathy, social intelligence, and creativity 
can be successfully increased through training . Pre and 
post test situations show that the training and education 
produced by the specific strategies remains with the sub-
jects for long periods of time (e . g., Organ, 1977; Meline, 
1976; Torrance, 1974; Gantc et al., 1980; Gaud, 1975; 
Treffinger, et al., 1983 ). If training and education were 
given in the powerful combination of creative thought pro-
duction, social understanding, and empathic reaction, some 
interesting and benefic ial results could occur. 
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A Ne w Conce pt: Social Creat i vity 
Classrooms, e s p ec ially e lementary clas srooms, a r e 
models of eve ryday social living. Children constantly 
i n teract, cognitively and affectively , with each other 
and with one or more adults. They are together daily for 
at least seven hour s in a var i ety of social situations. 
A participant obse r ver of fourth grade children, as their 
teacher, for fourteen y e ars, I have watched certain child-
ren di s play unusual amounts of the qualities of social 
cognition and intelligence, empathy , and creativity in 
dealing with other children and adults. These children 
emerge above most others in their outstanding sensitivity, 
openness, understanding, social solution production, moti-
vation and foresight to address social problems and hurt. 
For the past three years, I have given the label, 
social l y creative, to these children (and to some adults). 
They seem to be at once shy yet outgoing when needed, not 
strongly aggressive yet leaders when necessary to address 
some hurt. Some show artistic or literary talents and yet 
their creativity shines most when interacting with others. 
They aren't usually at either extreme of intelligence. 
They can have a certain playfulness and sense of humor as 
long as it is not hurtful humor. They seem to have the 
ability to form close friendships and yet are flexible and 
gregarious in their relationships. These characteristics 
seem very close to characteristics of creativity that have 
~-:,,.-.,;• ~ 
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been ident ifie d by Tests of Creative ~hink i ng and biogra-
ph ical or life experience inventories and checklists 
t hroughout the creativity liter ature (Torrance, 1972). 
Sensitivity to tone and feelings, openness to ideas 
and peop le , motivation to address hurt, sensitivity to 
missing p ieces in a scenario, comprehensive solution pro-
duction a r e the characteristics named in Chapter o ne of 
this paper as a c luster of socially creative behavi ors. 
There is something b e ing identified here that could, on 
the basis of s i milarities and di f ferences across the con-
cepts reviewed in Chapte rs two t _rough four of this paper, 
be operationally defined as social creativity. These 
behaviors can be observed in natural settings and deserve 
to be studied. 
Although illusive to measure, it is obvious whe n 
socially creative characteristics are lacking in a person. 
There may be a way to measure t hi s observable concept, 
this combi nation of opposites, this human me taphor, this 
social creativity. There may be a link between proper 
scientific understa nding and metaphorical understanding. 
Approach to Mea 3~ring Social Creativity 
Likewise disagreement exists among theorists in the 
areas of social cognition, social intel l igence and empathy, 
as can surely be noted in Chapters two, three a nd four of 
this paper. There is the same disagreement among theorists 
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as to the validity of creativity as a construct and even 
to the validity of the tests that measure it. Perhaps, 
as Bruner (1973) states, "We can do worse than to live 
with a metaphoric understanding of creativity." A meta-
phoric understanding may be a necessary and informative 
beginning to the understanding of social creativity. 
Clearly, this paper has utilized such an understanding. 
There may, however, be an approach that while quali-
tative in its design and use of descriptive instruments 
and naturalistic in its operation, may, nonetheless, still 
be quantifiable. Scarlett, Press and Crockett (1971) and 
Peevers and Secord (1973), in studies of similar design, 
were able to reliably use free description of peers 
technique. These free descriptions can be either oral 
or written. Content analysis was done on the descriptions 
as to the simplicity or complexity of the items ranging 
from concrete constructs (e.g., his hair is red) to abstract 
constructs (e.g., he is kind). 
Livesly and Bromley (1973) in support of a more natu-
ralistic method of experimentation states, 
It can be argued that some investigators seem to have assumed that the processes and variables in person perception were fairly obvious and that all 
that was required was a kind of rigorous experi~ 
mental proof. This assumption could lead investi-gators to experimentally manipulate what they con-
sider to be key variables only to find that their 
results cannot be corroborated by the findings of 
simpler and more naturalistic studies. . Further 
research in person perception seems to require 
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less emphasis on variables chosen for ease of experi-
mental manipulation and more emphasis on issues re-lated to fundamental concepts and problems, such as the content and organization of naturally occurring impressions. 
Natural methods for obtaining response data (such as 
free descriptions), no artificial constraint by inappro-
priate conditions, and freedom of subjects to select what-
ever information they find relevant are valid experimental 
designs concludes Bromley (1970). "Evidence at its 
simplest forms should be studied first. 1·1 states Bromley 
(1970). 
Free descriptions of peers, discussion of video pre-
sentations of social situations, and role-playing for 
social problem solving are all classroom activities that 
could be used as explanatory devices or measurement tools 
for social creativity. These activities could also be 
used as strategies of education to increase this much 
needed humanistic behavior. 
A Proposal for the Measurement of Social Creativity 
Adopting the assumptions of Livesly and Bromley (1973) 
and Bromley (1970), the free descriptions response method 
seems experimentally sound. In a classroom, children could 
be asked to write four peer descriptions each, keeping the 
subjects anonymous. They could be instructed to write a 
description, including any information they determine as 
relevant and necessary to fully describe that person's 
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looks, actions, thoughts and feelings, using one girl and 
one boy they like and one girl and one boy they do not 
like or like least in their class. Using peers they 
actually know makes the exercise more relevant and true-
to-life. Doing this exercise in a regular classroom 
setting as an ordinary class exercise would provide the 
benefits of a naturalistic response setting for children. 
I have been using this free description activity 
for three years in a fourth grade classroom setting. 
There are a number of advantages to using the free des-
criptions method. The subjects have a choice of response 
in a natural fashion. Factors such as anxiety, aggression, 
duplicity, embarrassment, and lack of writing skill may 
influence the descriptions, but to a lesser degree than 
in a laboratory situation and/or oral situation. Leaving 
the subjects free to respond in their own way reduces the 
effects of experimenter bias and assumptions. Finally, its 
advantage over ratings, Q sorts, and checklists for this 
age group is the similarity the task bears to familiar 
classroom exercises, allowing for more self-expression, for 
more creativity and metaphor because the children are not 
responding in fixed categories. 
Some examples of statements from the free description 
activity gleaned over a three year period and assessed 
intuitively, perhaps, would be valuable here to demonstrate 
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their potential f or quantification along with several 
available cr i t e ria, e.g., concrete versus abstract, unela-
borated versus detailed, socially sens i tive versus self-
absorption. One could reason that the more abstract 
descriptions, especially by fourth grade children, may 
be ones of socially c r eative children, or at the very 
least highly socially perceptive children. 
Ex amples of Concrete Descriptions: She has long hair 
sometimes in a pony tail. She likes sports. The boy I 
like wears blue pants a lot and sits next to me in school. 
The girl I like has long brown hair and is short and 
likes kickball. 
Examples of Abstract Descriptions: The boy I like acts 
kindly. Since I've known him he hasn•t ever picked a 
fight . He can think of very good ideas and is liked by 
a lot of people. 
The girl I like acts real nice. She feels real good 
about something when she does it right and she tries to 
do better if she does it wrong, but she doesn't show off. 
She loves sports and hates school lunches, 
I would describe the abstract descriptions as demon-
strating qualities associated with social creativity. 
The description shows sensitivity to the social behavior 
of others (e.g., acts kindly, fights), an awareness of the 
feelings and sources of the behavior of others (e.g., feels 
good when she does it right), and interest idea production 
and assessment (e.g., can think of ideas and is liked). 
The concrete descriptions reinforce the observable and 
affect is based on action directed to subject versus 
others. Although I have read and assessed only intui-
tively the three year collection of free descriptions, 
they could be analyzed in such a way to yield both 
qualitative and quantitative information which Light 
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and Pillemer (1982) say is the "best synthesis that makes 
the most out of both types of information." Content ana-
lysis by two raters could be used to assess the reliabi-
lity of the tool. 
If the information resulting from free description 
analysis were combined with teacher checklist information 
on social characteristics of the children, or with infor~ 
mation on creative solutions to social problems presented 
orally or visually or in a role-playing situation of action 
under risk, perhaps some insight might be captured that no 
other related area of research (social cognition, social 
intelligence, or empathy) has gained. This combination 
has useful explanatory power and holds potential as a 
training approach. 
The free description classroom activity used in a 
variety of situations could become a method for teachers 
to assess the levels of social creativity within the 
class. Activities extending the free descriptions, such 
as class discussions of them, and other activities, such 
as analyzing philosophically a video presentation of a 
social problem, could e xtend the understanding of others 
and even raise the l eve l of social perception of indivi-
duals. In a manner similar to the successful use of 
video presentations in the field of moral education, a 
video could be shown of parents and children riding in a 
car. The children are arguing over a toy . A class dis-
cussion of the situation and socially creative solutions 
could be held or the free description activity could be 
used as a writing exercise. Another video situation 
might be that of children on a playground trying to or-
ganize a game and choose teams. A video could be made 
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of any situation listed in Chapter one of this paper 
without the socially creative ending . The teacher would 
simply ask what different thing might be done. Why? What 
other alternatives are there? What if you were in charge? 
Role - playing is a powerful training strategy used in 
classrooms for subject content review and understanding. 
The role-playing tool could be used for social problem-
solving and decision-making since it allows a person to 
see a situation from at least two points of view, a natural 
personal point of view and that of another, whose role the 
child could take. Role-taking can have an enormous in~ 
fluence on how one perceives events, problems and people. 
It can cultivate creative social understanding, a tol-
erance for human differences and ambiguity, and a decision-
making strategy in the solution of social problems. The 
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risk in action of role-taking is somewhat red uced through 
fantasy but nonethele ss holds potential for helping the 
actor to develop a tolerance for risk-taking, independence 
of judgment, and persistence in defending one ' s convictions. 
It can creatively extend the understanding and tolerance 
for differences and the decision- making processes used in 
social situations. Also a video tape could be made of the 
role-playing situation to view for the students as later 
analysis. 
One example of socially creative role-play that I 
have used in my fourth grade classes begins as an imagina-
tion exercise. The children are grouped in a circle on 
the playground and asked to imagine that a large hole has 
appeared there. The children are asked to list all the 
ways that the hole could be made (a fluency exercise). 
Then the class is divided into groups and told to name 
other ways the hole could have been made but they must list 
a new category for each new idea (e.g., idea: a space ship; 
category: outer space invaders). This device for extending 
flexibility adds the catego_y dimension to the thinking pro-
cess . Each group then is asked to role-play social situa-
tions revolving around an idea and category they s elect 
from the ones they have listed (e.g., idea: bomb; cate-
gory: enemies or idea: airplane with people on board; 
category: accidents). Making decisions and finding pro-
blems that could arise and solutions for these problems 
75 
certainly is an exercise tha t appears to stimulate socially 
creative thoughts. Each student must change sides (rol e s) 
at least once. At the fourth grade level, the children 
view this exercise as a game which allows them to function 
at psycho logical safety and authenticity. It provides an 
opportunity for social understanding in action, the social 
creativity in human development that results can be used 
as a useful explanatory device as well as a method of 
training for social creativity. 
Whi le I have described these activities and recommen-
dations in the setting in which I have developed and 
piloted them, I fully believe that their structure is use-
ful and appropriate at a wide variety of levels as measure 
and training devices. I suspect they will be found to be 
appropriate from kindergarten to adult. A belief I hope 
further research will confirm. 
Conclusion 
Behrens (1974) theoretically analyzed a Chaplin film, 
'~Easy Street," to illustrate the similarity between comedy 
and creative solutions to problems. Forced equations or 
metaphors according to Behrens (1974), going out side the 
bounds, were common in Chaplin's humor and yet this meta-
phoric thinking, this tendency to extract forced rela-
tionships is needed to solve problems creatively, both 
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practical and social, in daily life (e.g., Duncker, 1945, 
creativity experiment, using nail, weight and cord to 
make a pendulum). 
Perhaps, this paper has raised some forced equation 
questions also. Perhaps, the juxtaposition of the con-
cepts of creativity and social cognition with the affec-
tive response will illuminate the social characteristics 
of creativity or the creative characteristics of social 
cognition. Emotion could be seen as firing and sustain-
ing the process of social interaction. My hope is that 
further consideration by the readers of this paper, of 
this new approach, this powerful combination of creative 
social understanding and action called social creativity 
will broaden the understanding of this necessary and use-
ful ability and tool. 
As Spring 
Agitates the earth 
to bestow greenery 
blo ssoms and 
gently breezes on it, 
so is man 
shaken and endowed 
when he becomes aware 
of the 
creative force 
in him. 
Johann Magrohofer 
1787-1836 
That creative force, when turned socially to interrela-
tionships, could change the person, the community, the 
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world. Do not ask, why; ask, why not? The combination 
of the art and the scie nce of social creativi ty should 
be the focus of con tinued study i n natural ist ic settings. 
S E L E C T E D B I B L I O G R A P H Y 
Amabile, Teres a M. The social psychology of creativity; 
a cornpone ntial conceptualizati on. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 1983, i.2_, 357-376. 
Anderson, N. H., and Hubert S . Effects of concomitant 
verbal recall on order effects in personality, impressio n formati on . Journal o f Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 1963, 2, 379-391. 
Anderson, I., and Messick, S. Social competency in young 
chi ldren . Developmental Psy cho l ogy, 1974, 10, 282-293. 
Arieti, S . Creativity: The magic synthesis . New York : Basic Books, 1976. 
Aspy, David N. Empathy: Let's get the hell on with it. The Counseling Psychologist, 1975, 5, 10-14. 
Ballenbach, A. K., and Madigan , R. J. Effects of induced 
mood on social cognitions. Psychological Reports, 1982, 51, 763 - 769. 
Barron, F. Creativity and p e rsonal freedom. New York: Van Nostrand Company, 1968 . 
Barron, F . Artist in the making. New York: Seminar Press, 1972, 161-162. 
Beach, L., and Wertheime r , H. A free response approach to the study of person cognition. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1961, g, 367-374. 
Behrens, Roy R. On creativity and humor: An analysis of 
easy street. Journal of Creative Behavior, 1974, !, 227-238. 
Bekdal, C. K. In search of the wild duck. The Gifted Child Quarterly, 1 97 7, 21, 14-18. 
Bellingham , Richard L. On researching the researchers. The Counseling Psychologist, 1978, l, 55-58. 
78 
79 
Bender, I. E., and Hastorf, A. H. On measuring generalized 
empathic ability (Social s e nsitivity ). Journal of 
Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1953, !§_, 503-506. 
Bergin, A. E. The eva luation of therapeutic out comes in 
Bergin and Garfield (eds.). Handbook of Psychotherapy 
and Behavior Change: An Empirical Evaluation. 
New York : Wi ley, 1971. 
Berndt, T. J."Relations Between Social Cognition, Non -
social Cognit i on, and Social Behavior: The Case of 
Friendship." In Flavell, J. H. , and Ross, L. (eds . ) , 
Social Cogni t ive Development, New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981, 176-198. 
Bernstein, Robert M. The relationship between developments 
in self and peer perception during adolescence. 
,Journal of Genetic Psychology, 1983, 142, 75-93. 
Black, Hedda, and Phillips, Shelly. An intervention program 
for the development of empathy in student teachers. 
Journal of Psychology, 1982, 112, 159-168. 
Bleedorn, B. Looking Ahead, Buffalo, New York: DOK 
Publishers, 198 1 . 
Blickhahn, Kate. Writing project scoring instructions. 
C.A.T.E. Asilomar Conference, fall, 1973. 
Borke, H. Interpersonal perception in young children: 
egocentricism or empathy? Developmental Psychology, 
1971, 1, 263-269. 
Bromley, 0. B. "An Approach to Theory Construction in the 
Psychology of Development and Aging." In Goulet, L. R., 
and Baltes, P. B. (eds.), Life-Span Developmental 
Psychology. New York: Academic Pres s , 1970. 
Bronfenbrenner, Urie "The Study of Identification Through 
Interpersonal Perception." In Taguiri, R., and Petrollo,L. (eds.), Person Perception and Interpersonal Behavior. 
Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1958, 
110-130. 
Bruner, J. S.; Shapiro, D.; and Taguiri, R. "The Meaning of 
Traits in Isolation and in Combination." In Taguiri, R. 
and Petrello, L. (eds.), Person Perception and 
Interpersonal Behavior; Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 1958, 277-288. 
80 
Bruner, Jerome S. Be yond the information given (Studies 
in the psychology of knowing). New York: W. W. Norton 
and Company, 1973, 208-217. 
Buckley, Norman; Siege l , Linda, S.; and Ness, Steven 
Egocentrism, empathy, and altruistic behavior in young 
children. Developmental Psychology, 1979 1 15, 329-330. 
Cantor, N., and Mischel, W. Traits as prototypes: effects 
on recognition memory. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1977, ~, 38~48. 
Cantor, N., and Mischel, W. "Prototypes in Person 
Perception." I n Berkowitz, L. (ed.) , Advances in 
Experimental Social Psychology. New York; Academic Press, 1979. 
Carlson, R. Where is the person in personality research? Psychological Bulletin, 1971, 7-2, 203-219. 
Cattell, R. B. Abilities: their structure, growth, and 
action. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971. 
Cheek, J.M., and Buss, A.H. Shyness and sociability. Journal of personality and Social Psychology, 1981, 
41, 330-339. 
Clark, K. B. Empathy: a neglected topic in psychological 
research. Arnerican _Psychologist, 1980, 35, 187-190. 
Cohen, Claudia E. Inferring the characteristics of other people: Categories and attribute accessibility. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 1983, !_!, 34-44. 
Cronbach, L. I. Processes ~=fecting scores of understanding 
of others. Psychological Bulletin, 1955, g, 177-193. 
Cutrona, Carolyn E., and Feshbach, Seymour. Cognitive and behavioral correlates of children's differential use 
of social information. Child Development, 1979, 50, 
1036-1042. 
Damon, William "Exploring Children's Social Cognition on Two Fronts." In Flavel, J. H., and Ross, L. (eds.), Social Cognitive Development. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981, 154-175. 
81 
Davis, Mark H. Measuring individual differences in empathy: 
Evidence for a multid imensional approach. J o urnal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 1983, 44 , 113-126. 
Demers, Ramong Y., and Ske ll, Rose. Mean Scores for Kohn 
Social Competence found markedly different in two 
samples. Developmental Psychology, 1981, 17, 463-464. 
Deutsch, Francine Cognitive processes and social cognition 
in kindergar ten children. Journal of Genetic 
Psychology, 1981, 138, 63-73. 
Dubin, R., and Dubin, L. R. Children's social perceptions, 
a review of research. Child Developmen~, 1965, 1§_, 
809-938. 
Duncker, K. On problem solving. Psychological Monograph, 
58, 1945. 
Eisenberg-Berg, Nancy. Development of children's prosocial 
moral judgment. Developmental Psychology, 1979, 15, 
128-137. 
Felleman, Elyse S. Children's and adults' r ecognition of 
spontaneous and posed emotional expressions in young 
children. Developmental Psychology, 1983, 1:2_, 405-413. 
Feshbach, N. D. Empathy in children: some theoretical and 
empirical considerations. Counseling Psychologist, 
1975, ~' 25-30. 
Fiske, D. W. Measuring the concepts of personality. Chicago: 
Aldine, 1971. 
Flavell, J. H."Monitoring Social Cognitive Enterprises: 
Something Else That May Develop in the Area of Social 
Cognition." In Flavell, J. H., and Ross, L. (eds.), 
Social Cognitive Development, New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981, 272-287. 
Flavell, J. H., and Ross, L. "Concluding Remarks." In 
Flavell, J. H., and Ross, L. (eds.), Social Cognitive 
Development, New York: Cam~ridge University Press, 
1981, 306-316. 
Ford, Martin E., and Tisak, Marie S. A further search for 
social intelligence. Journal of Educational Psychology, 
1983, 7-2_, 196-206. 
Ford, M. E . Social cognition a nd s o c i al compe tence in 
adolescence. Dev~ lopmental Psychology , 19 82, _!_§_, 323-240 . 
France, A. William and Rich, Kay Child care worJ-:e rs : 
the human response. Child Care Quarte r l y, 1976, ~' 27-34. 
Frank, Susan J. The fa c ilitation of empathy through 
training in imag i nation . Dissertaion Abstracts Internationa l, 1978, (Jan.),~' 3392. 
82 
Gallagher, J . Teaching the gifted child. Boston: Allyn 
and Bacon, 1975. 
Gantt, Susan; Billingsley , Donna; and Giordano, Jeffrey A. Paraprofessional ski :J. : Maintenance of empathic 
sensitivity after training. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 1 980, ~' 374-379. 
Gardner, Howard The seven fromes of mind. Psychology Today, 1984, 18, 20-26. 
Gelman, Rachel and Spelke, Elizabeth "The Development of Thoughts About Animate and Inanimate Objects: Implications for Research on Social Cognition." In Flavel, J. H. and Ross, L. (eds.), Social Cognitive Development. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981, 43-66. 
Getzels, J. W. and Jackson, P. W. Creativity and intelligence . New York: Wiley, 1961. 
Gilligan, Carol In a different voice. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1982. 
Gladstein, Gerald A. Empathy and counseling outcome: an 
empirical and conceptual review. Counseling Psycholo-gist, 1977, ~, 43-47. 
Gettman, J.; Gonso, J.; and Rasmussen, B. Social inter-
action, social competence and friendship in children. Child Development, 1975, i&_, 709-718. 
Goud, Nelson H. Effects of empathy training on under-graduate education majors. Humanist Educator, 1975, 
_!2, 121-127. 
Grief, E. G. and Hogan, R. The theory and measurement of 
empathy. Journal of Counse~ing Psychology, 1 973, 20, 280-284. 
8 3 
Guil f ord, J . P . Three faces of i n t e l lect. Amer ican 
Ps y s; hologi st , 1 959 , .!_! , 469- 479 . 
Guilford, J. P. ; O' Su lliva n, Ma u reen; deMi lle, R. The 
measurement o f social i n t e lligence . Repo r t s from the 
Psy cholog ical Labora tory , University o f Sout hern 
Californ ia, June, 1965, No. 34. 
Guilford, J . P . The nature of h uman intelligence . New York: 
McGraw- Hill , 19 67 . 
Guilford, J.P . ; Hendricks, Moana; Hoe pfner, 
Measuring creative s ocial inte l lig ence. 
the Psy chological Laboratory, Univers i ty 
Cal1forn1a, January, 1969 , No. 42. 
Ralph 
Reports from 
of Southern 
Guilfo rd, J. P. "Cre ative Think ing and Problem Solving. " In 
Ostrovsky, Eve r ett, Self Discovery and Soc i al Aware ness. 
New York: Wiley and Sons, Inc., 19 74, 102 - 103. 
Gui l ford , J. P . Is some creative thinking i r rational ? 
Journal of Creat i ve Behavior, 1974, l§_, 151-154. 
Hendric k, Cly de (ed), Perspectives on social p sychology . 
New York: Erlbaum Assoc. Pub . , 1977, 63- 6 6 . 
Hoffman, Martin L. Sex differences in empathy and related 
behaviors. Psychological Bulletin, 1977, ~, 712-122. 
Hogan, R. Development of an empathy s c ale. Jou r nal of 
Consulting and Clinical Psychol_ogy, 1969, 3 3_, 307-316. 
Hogan , Robert Empathy: A conceptual and psychometric 
ana l ysis. Counseling Psychologist, 1975, ~' 14-18. 
Hughes, Robert; Tingle, Bruce, A., and Saivin, Douglas B. 
Dev elopment of empathic understand i ng in child ren. 
Ch i ld Development, 1981 , ~' 122-128 . 
Iannotti, R. J. The nature and measurement of empathy in 
children. Counseling Psychologist, 1975, 5, 21-25. 
Jarial, Gurpal s. Are first born children more creative? 
Psychological Reports, 198 2 , 5, 316-335. 
Keating, D. P. A s earch for social intelligence. Journal 
of Educational Psychology, 1978, 2.Q., 218-223 . 
84 
Kelley " H. H. The p roce sse s of c ausa l a t t r i butio n. Ame ric a n 
P ,:ycho l o g is t s, 19 73 , ~ ' 107-1 28 . 
Klein, R. D. Inq u iry i n t o the f ac tors re lated to cre ativity . 
Ele mentary Sc hool J ourna l , 1982, ~, 256 - 265. 
Kohlbe r g, Lawr e nce '' Mora l Stage s and Mo r alization: The 
Cognitive-Deve lopme n ta l Approa ch . " I n Lickona, T. (ed . ), 
Moral Deve l o pment a nd Beh a v ior: Theory, Research and 
Social Issues, New York : Hol t , Rinehart and Winston, 
1976. 
Kubler- Ross , Elisabe th Living with de a th and d y ing. New York : 
Macmillan Publishir ' Company, Inc., 19 81. 
Kurde k, L.A. and Rodgen , M. M. Percept ual , cognit i ve, and 
effective perspective taking in kinder garte n through 
s i xth grade chi l d ren. Deve lopmental Psychology, 1 975, 
11, 643-650. 
Lambert, M. J. ; DeJulio , S. S.; and Stein, D. M. Therap ist 
interpersonal skills; process, outcome, methodological 
considerations, a nd recommendations for future research . 
Psychological Bul l etin, 1978, 85, 676 - 689. 
Lambert , M. J . anC DeJulio, S. S. Outcome research in 
Carhu ff's human r e s ource developmen t training programs; 
where is t he d onut? Counseling Psychologist , 1977, ~, 
79-86. 
Light, Richard and Pillemer, David Numbers and narrative: 
combining their s trengths in research reviews . Harvard 
Educational Review, 1982 , ~, 1-23 . 
Livesley, W. J. and Bromley , D. G. Person perception in 
childhood and adolescence. London : John Wiley & Sons, 
1973. 
Lord, C.; Ross, L.; a nd Lepper, M. R . Biased assimilation 
and attitude polarization: the effect of prior theories 
on subsequently considered evidence. Journal of 
Pe r sonality and Soc i al Psychology, 1979, !, 2098-2109. 
Luborsky, L. B.; Chand l er, M.; Auerbach, A.H.; Cohen, J.; 
and Bachrach, H. M. Fa ctors influencing the outcome of 
psy chotherapy : a rev iew of quantitative research. 
Psychologi ca l Bullet in , 1971, 22_, 145-185. 
85 
Ma cKinnon, D. The nature a nd nu t ure of creative talent. 
American Psycholog ist, 1962, 1~, 484 - 495. 
MacKi n non, D. In search of human effectivene ss . Buffalo, 
N2w York; Creative Ed ucation Foundation, 1978. 
Marsh, Diane, T.,; Serafic a , Fel icis ima, C.; and Barenboim, 
Carl Interrelation ships a 1nong perspective taking , 
interpersonal problem- so l ving and interpersonal 
functioning. Journal o f Genetic Psychology, 1981, 138, 37-48. 
Maslow, A. H. "Creativity in Self-actualizing People," In 
Anderson, H. H. (ed.), Creativity and its Cultivation, 
New York: Harper-Row, 1959. 
Mel ine , Caroline W. Does the medium matter? Journal of 
Communication, 1976, ~' 81-89. 
Mischel, W. Toward cognitive social learning reconceptuali-
zation of personality. Psychological Review, 1973, ~' 252-283. 
Mischel, W.; Je f f r ey, K. M.; and Patterson, C. J. The 
layman's use of trait and behavioral information to 
predict behavior. Journal of Research in Personality, 
~, 231-242. 
Mischel, W. On the interface of cognition 
beyond the person -- situation debate. 
Psychologist, 1979, l!, 740-754 . 
and personality 
American 
Mi schel, W. "Metacognition and the Rules of Delay," I n 
Flavell, J. H. and Ross, L. (eds.), Social Cognitive 
Development. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981, 
240-271. 
Mood, Darlene W.; Johnson, James E.; and Shantz, Ca rolyn U. 
Social comprehension and affect-matching in young 
children. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 1978, 24, 63-66. ~ 
Morissette, Marilyn L. Some relationships 
predisposition, empathy and aggression 
Dissertation Abstracts International. 
4692-4693. 
among imaginative 
in children. 
1978 (Feb.),~, 
Moss, F. A. and Hunt, T. Are you socially intelligent? 
Scientific American, 1927, 137, 108-110. 
86 
Naisbitt, John 
our lives. 
Megatrends: in new directions transfor ming 
New York: Warne r Books, Inc., 1982. 
Neimeyer, Greg J. and Banikiotes, Paul G. Self-disclosure fl exibility , empathy, and perceptions of adjustment 
and attraction. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 1981, 
~ ' 272-275. 
Neisser, U. "General, Academic and Artificial Intelli-
gence." In Resnik, L. B. (ed.), The Nature of 
Intelligence. New Jersey: Erlbaum, 1976, 135-144. 
Neisser, U. "The Concept of Intelligence." In Sternberg, R. J. and Detterman, D. K. (eds.), Human Intelligence Perspectives on its Theory and Measurement. New Jersey: Ablex, 1979, 257-268. 
Nelson , Katherine "Social Cognition in a Script Framework." In Flavell, J. H. and Ross, L . (eds.), Social Cognitive Development. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981, 97-118. 
Nesselroth, Jeanne S. Creativ ity and experience as related 
to counselor 's level of empathic communication. 
Dissertation Abstracts International, 1979 (Feb.), 39, 4046-4047. 
Organ , Linda M. The effect of an experimental creative 
thought production program on figural creativity score s 
of second and third grade children. Dissertation Abstracts International, 1977, (Sept.), ~' 1214. 
Peevers and Secord Developmental changes in attribution 
of descriptive concepts to persons . Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 1973, ~' 123-237. 
Piaget, J. The psychology of intelligence. New York: 
International University Press, 1963, 60. 
Rachman, I . J. ''The Effects of Psychological Treatment." In Erpenck, H. S. (ed.), Handbook of Abnormal Psycho-
logy. New York: Basic Books, 1973. 
Reardon, Richard; Roley, Jeanne, M.; and Walker, Ronald E. Social intelligence and vocational choice. 
Psychological Reports, 1979, !_!, 853-854. 
87 
Renzulli, J. S. The enrichment triad model. Mansfield 
Center, Connecticut: Creative Learning Press, 1977. 
Roe, A. The making of a scientist. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1952. 
Rogers, C. R. On becoming a person. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961. 
Rogers, C. R. The necessary and sufficient conditions of 
therapeutic personality change. Journal of Consulting Psychology, 1957, ~' 95-103. 
Rogers, C. R. Empathic: an unappreciated way of being. Counseling Psychologist, 1975, ~' 2-10. 
Ross, Lee "The Intuitive Scientist Formulation and its 
Developmental Implications." In Flavel, J. H. and 
Ross, L. (eds.), Social Cognitive Development. 
New York; Cambridge University Press, 1981, 1-42. 
Rothenberg, B. Children's social sensitivity and the 
relationship of interpersonal competence, interper-
sonal comfort, and intellectual level. Developmental Psychology, 1970, ~, 335-350. 
Scarlett, H. H.; Press, A. M.; and Crockett, W. J. 
Children's description of peers: a wernerian develop-
mental analysis. Child Development, 1971, ~' 439-453. 
Shanley, L.A.; Walker, R. E.; and Foley, J.M. Social intelligence a concept in search of data. Psychological Reports, 1971, ~. 1123-1132. 
Shantz, Carolyn U. Empathy in relation to social cognitive development. Counseling Psychologist, 1975, 5, 18-21. 
Sternberg, R. J.; Conway, B. E.; Ketron, J. L.; and 
Bernstein, M. People's conceptions of intelligence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1981, !!., 37-55. 
Strayer, Janet A naturalistic study of empathic behaviors 
and their relation to affective states and perspective 
taking skills in preschool children. Child Development, 
1980, ~, 815-822. 
88 
Snyder, N.; Tanke, E. D.; and Berscheid, E. Social perception and interpersonal behavior: on the self-fulfilling nature of social stereotypes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1977, 12, 656-666. 
Thorndike, E. L. Intelligence and its uses. Harpers Magazine, 1920, 140, 227-235. 
Thornton, E. L. The effect upon judgments of personality traits of varying a single factor in a photograph. Journal of Social Psychology, 1943, 18, 127-148. 
Thornton, E. L. The effect of wearing glasses on judgments 
of personality traits of people seen briefly. Journal 
of Applied Psychology, 1944, ~' 203-207. 
Torrance, E. Paul Non-test ways of identifying the 
creatively gifted. The Gifted Child Quarterly, 1962, 
~, 71-75. 
Torrance, E. Paul Conditions for creative learning. Childhood Education, 1963, ~' 367=370. 
Torrance, E. Paul Examples and rationales of test tasks for assessing creative abilities. Journal of Creative Behavior, 1972, ~, 79-83. 
Torrance, E. Paul "Conditions for Creative Learning.'' In Ostrovsky, C. (ed.), Self-Discovery and Social Awareness, New York: Wiley and Sons, 1974, 76-78. 
Torrance, E. Paul and Hall, I. D. 
reaches of creative potential. 
Behavior, 1980, !_!, 1-19. 
Assessing the further 
Journal of Creative 
Treffinger, D. J.; Renzulli, J. S.; and Feldhusen, J. F. Problems in the assessment of creative thinking. Journal of Creative Behavior, 1971, 1, 194-212. 
Truax, C. B.; Wittmer, J.; and Wargo, D. G. Effects of the therapeutic conditions of accurate empathy, non-possessive warmth and genuineness on hospitalized 
mental patients during group therapy. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 1971, '?:.]_, 137-142. 
Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. Belief in the law of small 
numbers. Psychological Bulletin, 1971, 7-i_, 105-110. 
Viborg, G. G. The child as an observer of social situations. Psychological Research Bulletin, 1982, ~, 20. 
89 
Wheeler, Barbar a R. Creativi t y in social wor k : An education e xperiment. Dissertation Abstracts Interna-tional, 1976, (Fe b.), 12_, 5151. 
Woodman, Richard W. Creativity as a concept in personality theory. Journal of Creativ e Behavior, 1981, .!2_, 43-66. 
Zajonc, R. B. Feeling and thinking: preferences need no inferences. American Psychologist, 1980, ~, 151-175. 
Newspaper s : 
Blue Sky Days, "Can you Help a Mother Love Her Baby More?" Confidential Chat, Boston Sunday Globe, October 2, 1983, p. 820. 
Hall, Barbara, "Asimov Speaks on Schools of Future", Boston Sunday Globe, March 18, 1984, p. 85. 
